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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

ISSUE I
Did the trial court err in ruling as a matter of law that
Mr. Reynolds had no right to enjoin his wife from aborting their
unborn child?
ISSUE II
Should

the

trial court

have balanced

the

rights and

interests of Mr. and Mrs. Reynolds and determined whether Mr.
Reynolds1

right

to

procreate

and

associate

with

his

child

should, under the circumstances, prevail over Mrs. Reynolds1
right to an abortion?
ISSUE III
Did the trial court err in holding that this controversy
involves "state action", and therefore was controlled by Planned
Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1975)?
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Nature of the Case
This case stems from a divorce court dispute over the
disposition of the parties1 unborn child.

Only the abortion

related issues are involved in this appeal.
Course of Proceedings
Mr. Reynolds filed for divorce March 22, 1988 and was
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The Honorable Judge Garff, the first

available judge, signed the temporary order at about 12:55 p.m.
The order was served on the clinic about 1:25 p.m. and defendant
herself was not served until later that evening.

According to

the clinic, the abortion had been performed about 1:00.

This

Court denied the petition for interlocutory appeal the next day.
R. 126-127.
The

trial

court

certified

the

abortion

issue

immediate appeal and bifurcated the Case on May 20, 1988.

for
R.

139-141.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Fathers have fundamental liberty rights and interests in
their own children, which is of approximately equal value with
mothers' right to abortion.
decided this issue.

No controlling jurisdiction has

Due process rights may be accorded to a

father only by allowing a full hearing to weigh the respective
rights and interest of the parents.
This appeal

is not barred by mootness since it is a

controversy which is likely to repeat itself/ yet evades review.
No state action is involved, so the Roe v. Wade decisions
do not apply.

xi.

ARGUMENT

I.

Danforth does not preclude a court from balancing a father1s

rights in an unborn child with the mother's right to an abortion.

This is a case of first impression in Utah.
the mother
father's

has

claim

consistently

but

is

overcome

entirely

incorrectly
by

However,

argued

that the

the Supreme

Court's

decision in Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforthf 428 U.S.
52 (1975) .
lower

An overbroad reading of that case is the root of the

court's

error.

constitutionally

Danforth

require

the

held

consent

that
of

a
the

"State may not
spousef

as

is

specified under [the Missouri statute examined], as a condition
for abortion during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy.11

Id. at 69.

But the Missouri statute troubling the Court purported to create
rights much different from those asserted by the father here.
In Danforth
absolute vetof
of the other.

the legislature had given one spouse an

for any or no reasonf to the absolute exclusion
A husband (who might not even be the father, Id.

at 69) had the unilateral power to forbid that an abortion be
performed on his wifef and his mandate could not be controverted
or reviewed by any higher authority.
father

here

interests,

seeks
Missouri

a

case
had

by

done

Id. at 71.

case

balancing

its

own

While the

of

rights and

arbitrary

balancing,

striking the balance permanently and absolutely in favor of the
father.
test.

The Court struck down a per se rulef not a balancing

Since the mother here seeks an unbridled right to decide
whether the fetus is born or terminated, without regard for the
father, the Court could find her position to be more repugnant to
the

spirit

of Danforth

than the individualized

balancing the

father proposes.
The trial court mistakenly read Danforth to have already
accomplished
sought.

the balancing of rights and interests the father

It is an understandable error, sincef out of context, we

find the following quote Judge Young read at the hearing:
Inasmuch as it is the woman who physically bears
the child and who is the more directly and
immediately affected by the pregnancyf as between
the two, the balance weighs in her favor.
Id. at 71.
The Supreme Courtf however, was weighing the effect of
leaving the statutory per se absolute veto intact against the
effect of striking it down and allowing the woman a choice.

As

between these absolutes, the Court preferred the right of the
mother.
The
considering

Court

carefully

illustrated

the constitutionality

that

it

was

not

of a more tailored approach

allowing for a case by case balance.

Referring to the spousal

consent provision it struck down, the Court wrote:
This section does much more than insure that the
husband participate in the decision whether his
wife should have an abortion. The State, instead,
has determined that the husband's interest in
continuing the pregnancy of his wife always
outweighs any interest on her part in terminating
it irrespective of the condition of their marriage.
The State, accordingly, has granted him the right
to prevent unilaterally, and for whatever reason,
the effectuation of his wife's and her physician's
decision to terminate her pregnancy.
This state
determination . . . has interposed an absolute

obstacle to a woman's decision that Roe held to be
constitutionally protected from such interference.
Id. at 70-71 [emphasis supplied].
In the wake of Danforth, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals was careful to limit its ruling to the facts when faced
with a similarly broad Kentucky statute.
541 F.2d 523 (1978).

Wolfe v. Schroering,

After striking down the absolute veto with

which the legislature had endowed the husband, the court vowed it
would

refrain

from deciding

whether

a more

statute would pass constitutional muster.
Danforth

and

its

progeny,

narrowly

drafted

541 F.2d at 526.

despite

claims

to

the

contrary, do not really deal with the rights of men as fathers.
They merely consider the rights of husbands.
Danforth struck down was overbroad.

Thus, the statute

Not only did it give a veto

power rather than an interest or voice for balancing, the power
was given to husbands, not just fathers.

The fathers issue

remains to be decided by any court of controlling jurisdiction
over this case.

II.

Fathers have constitutional rights to their children.
Along with

society, in the twentieth

century courts

recognized that fathers have not only duties, but also important
constitutional

rights

in

their

children.

Failure

to

give

appropriate weight to a father's interests is a violation of
these rights.
The United States Supreme Court's decisions on point
follow two important lines of cases: those supporting the right
- 3 -

to procreate
rights.

and

those

limiting

the

535

[w]ithout

of

parental

"Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very

existence and survival of the race."
U.S.

termination

(1942).
doubt

The Court
[the

liberty

has

Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316

repeatedly

guaranteed

under

emphasized
the

that

fourteenth

amendment] denotes the right of the individual to . . . establish
a home and bring up children. . . ."

Meyer v. Nebraskaf 262 U.S.

390, 399 (1923) .

A.

Fathers have a right to procreate.

"Procreation" means "the entire process of bringing a
new individual into the world."
Dictionary (24th ed. 1965) .
Baby

M,

537 A.2d

1227

Dorland's Illustrated Medical

Similarly, the recent case of In re

(N.J. 1988), stated,

"Itlhe

right to

procreate very simply is the right to have natural children. . .
It is no more than that."

Id. at 1253.

Obviously, the right to procreate—to
child—extends to both parents.

have a natural

But a mother's procreation right

is logically distinguishable from the limited right granted by
Roe v. Wade to destroy the creation.

410 U.S. 113

(1973).

Because the mother also has the right to procreate, the father
may not force her to have an abortion.
So.2d 623 (Ala. 1978) .

Harris v. State, 356

And despite his desire and offer to pay

for an abortion, he may not escape his paternal duties when the
mother refuses to abort.

Id. at 624.

Similarly, the father claims no right to force a woman
to become a mother against her wishes in order to satisfy his
- 4 -

desire to be a father.

He has no right to force a woman to have

intercourse with him, and in this case he did not.

When the

action began, the parties were already mother and father of an
unborn child.

The action was precipitated by the mother's desire

to change father's status from father to manf extinguishing the
father's constitutional rightsf by terminating the child.

B.

Fathers

have

rights

to

raise

and

enjoy

their

offspring.
Separate and in addition to the right to father, is the
right to be a father.

Natural parents have constitutional rights

to raise, associate with, and enjoy their children that a state
cannot sever absent clear and convincing evidence of parental
unfitness.

Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).

these family rights are

"fundamental".

In short,

Santosky held that a

"preponderance of the evidence" standard of proof for termination
of

parental

fundamental

rights
liberty

failed
interest

to

sufficiently

recognize

of natural parents

custody, and management of their child."

"the

in the care,

455 U.S. at 753.

Only

"clear and convincing evidence" that parental rights are not in
the best
rights.

interest

of the child can overcome such fundamental

In re Brand, 479 So.2d 66 (Ala.Civ.App. 1985).
Santosky observed that [elven when blood relationships

are strained, parents retain a vital interest in preventing the
irretrievable destruction of their family life."
753.

455 U.S. at

In

1972

Stanley

v.

Illinois,

405

U.S. 645

recognized paternal rights of illegitimate fathers.
was such a break with past civil and common
accused

the

people, too."

Court

of

"having

just

discovered

(1972),

The decision

lawr
that

one writer
dads are

Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy, Mich. L.

Rev. 81:463, 499.

It appears some sectors of society wish to

keep that discovery a secret.

Stanley summed up the rights of

fathers as follows:
The private interest here, that of a man in the
children he has sired and raised, undeniably
warrants
deference
and,
absent
a
powerful
countervailing interest, protection.
It is plain
that the interest of a parent in the companionship,
care, custody, and management of his or her
children 'comes to this Court with a momentum for
respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties
which
derive
merely
from
shifting
economic
arrangements.'
405 U.S. at 651.
The Stanley Court did not stop there, but went on to
observe:
The Court has frequently emphasized the importance
of the family. The rights to conceive and to raise
one's children have been deemed 'essential,1 Meyer
v. Nebraska, 'basic civil rights of man,' Skinner
v. Oklahoma, and [rlights far more precious . . .
than property rights,' May v. Anderson.
'It is
cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture
of the child reside first in the parents . . . .
The integrity of the family unit has found
protection in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and the Ninth Amendment.
[405 U.S. at 651, Citations Omitted].
Santosky confirms that the father's fundamental rights
to care, custody and management of his child originate in the
liberty clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

455 U.S. at 745. So

the foundation of the father's rights as father is the same one
- 6 -

on

which

Roe

abortion.
declared

v.

Wade

found

410 U.S. 153.

a

right

of

privacy

protecting

A father's right in his child has been

"cognizable and substantial" under the United States

Constitution.

Quillon v. Walcottf 434 U.S. 246, 248 (1978).

Obviously such rights may not be enjoyed in an aborted
child.

His fundamental rights may only be fully exercised if he

is able to protect the child until live birth.

In fact one of

the basic interests of the father is that of providing "loving
protection" for the child.
3004 (1987) .

Rivera v. Minnichf 107 S.Ct. 3001,

Hence the father here sought to have his rights

balanced against those granted to the mother by the same Court.

C.

Utah carefully protects parental rights.

From the first compilation of statutes after statehood,
Utah has given the father and mother substantial rights in their
children.

See R.S.Utah

consistently

protected

1898 § 4.

since.

Utah's

Those

rights have been

Constitution

declares,

"Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to
the security of individual rights and the perpetuity of free
government."

Art. I § 27.

Fundamental rights of parents cannot

be stressed too often or guarded too closely.
Utah's

legislature

has

provided

that

any

physician

performing an abortion shall first follow various procedures.
76-7-301 et seq. , UCA 1953.

One is that he must "Hotify, if

possible, • . . the husband of the woman, if she is married."
76-7-304,

UCA

1953

(emphasis

§

supplied).

For

what

§

possible

purpose did the legislature require notification of the husband,
- 7 -

unless it is so he may take a role in the decision, resorting to
the courts if necessary, as the father did here.
Spousal notification statutes have been upheld.

Doe v.

Deschamps, 461 F.Supp. 682 (Mont. 1976); Scheinberg v. Smith, 659
F.2d 476 (1981) .
Like
provides,

the

"No

Fourteenth

person

shall

Amendment,

be deprived

property, without due process of law."

Utah's
of

Constitution

life, liberty or

Art. I § 7.

The words "life, liberty and property" are taken in
their

broadest

sense

as

indicative

subdivisions of all civil rights.
0. 203, 85 P.2d 608.

of

the

three

great

McGrew v. Industrial Comm., 96

"Property" embraces all valuable interests

a person may possess outside of himself, that is to say, outside
of his life and liberty.

It is not confined to mere tangible

property, but to every species of vested right.

Id.

It must

include, then, the rights to procreate, rear and enjoy children.
As indicated above, the interest vests upon actual conception of
an individual.
This provision has been used to protect the rights of
Utah parents, and should protect the father here, independent of
his federal protections.

In 1980 the legislature passed the

Children's Rights Act, ch. 40, 1980 Utah Laws 288, amending
78-3a-48(l), UCA 1953.

§

The requirement in the former statute

that the court find a parent "unfit or incompetent by reason of
conduct

or

condition

removed, and

seriously detrimental to the child" was

replaced with a provision permitting

involuntary

termination upon a finding that such termination will be in "the
- 8 -

child's best interest."
of Art, 1 § 7.

That change was struck down as violative

In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1374 (Utah 1982).

J.P. observed that until that amendment Utah's statutory
and

common

law have

parents except

invariably

upheld

the

in "extreme circumstances."

rights of natural
648 P.2d at 1366.

The Code, for example, allows adoption without consent of natural
parents only if the parent "has been judicially deprived of the
custody

of

the

child

on

account

of

desertion," or has abandoned the child.
1953.

cruelty,

neglect,

or

§§ 78-30-4, 78-30-5, UCA

See also current § 78-3a-48, UCA 1953.
On the other hand the state has an independent interest

in the welfare of its children.

State in re Jennings, 20 Utah 2d

50, 52, 432 P.2d 879, 880 (1967).

But the "best interests" or

"welfare" of the infant may only be considered after the parent's
rights are terminated for unfitness, etc.

In re J.P. , 648 P.2d

1364, 1369 (Utah 1982) .
By

the

1980

enactment,

Justice

Oaks

observed

the

legislature had failed to give appropriate weight to the right of
a fit, competent parent to a parent-child relationship.
at 1368.

648 P.2d

Rearing children is, after all, a "fundamental right."

In re Castillo, 632 P.2d 855, 856 (Utah 1981); State in re Walter
B^, 577 P.2d 119, 124 (Utah 1978)(plurality opinion).

Castillo

declared that "the ideals of individual liberty which protect the
sanctity

of one's home and

society. . . ."

family" are "essential

in a free

632 P.2d at 856.

Under both the Federal (Ammendement. IX) and State (Art.
I § 25 Constitutions, personal liberties are not limited to those

grantedf but are a retention of rights in the people.

See, In re

J.P. , 648 P.2d 1373, 1369 (Utah 1982) , which went on to state:
The rights inherent in family relationships—
husband-wifer parent-child, and sibling—are the
most obvious examples of rights retained by the
people.
They are "natural1 , 'intrinsic,' or
1
'prior
in the sense that our Constitutions
presuppose them, as they presuppose the right to
own and dispose of property. . . . Similarlyf the
Court has characterized the right to procreate as
among the 'basic civil rights of man.1 Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 . . . . Blackstone
deemed rthe most universal relation in nature . .
. [to be] that between parent and child.'
1 W.
Blackstonef Commentaries * 446.
648 P.2d at 1364.
Can it be doubted, then, that a father's
rights are of at least as great import as the abortion rights of
the mother?
A parent's inherent authority and right to rear his own
children are recognized as fundamental axioms of Anglo-American
culture.

To protect

the individual

in his

"constitutionally

guaranteed right to form and preserve the family is one of the
basic principals for which organized government is established."
In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1373 (Utah 1982).

D.

The father has shown a genuine interest.

In affidavits filed with the lower court, the father has
made clear that he not only wished that the child be allowed
life.

Rather, he offered to take and care for the child, meet

all his or her needs and completely excuse the mother from her
parental obligations.
first trimester.

He acted quickly, near the end of the

Importantly, the father was married to the

mother at all relevant times.

"Parental rights are at their apex

- 10 -

for parents who are married.ff

In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1374

(Utah 1982) .
In cases involving unwed fathers biology alone does not
give rise to constitutional rights in one's children.

The United

States Supreme Court has stated in recent cases that illegitimate
fathers have a protected relationship with their children only if
they exercise their rights by assuming genuine responsibility for
their children.
Quillon

See, Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979);

v. Walcott,

434

U.S. 246

(1978).

Although

no such

requirements are imposed upon natural fathers who are married to
the mother, like the parties here, this father has gone to great
lengths to protect his interests, but for naught.
The right to procreate becomes particularized where, as
here, conception results from an act of consensual intercourse.
Once so particularized, that right continues through birth and
beyond

to the age of majority.

particular

child

conceived

The father's

through

marital act are fundamental.

the

rights in the

parties1

consensual,

They are equal in weight to those

asserted by the mother, so a judicial balancing particularized to
their circumstances is required.
to disregard

It is surely

unconstitutional

the rights of one parent and enforce

rights of the other.

fully the

See, The Rights of the Father, Notre Dame

Lawyer 50:483 (1975); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
If the father acts promptly, he must be afforded an immediate
hearing to weigh the respective interests and burdens asserted by
the father and mother.

Id.

- 11 -

E.

A balance may have tipped in favor of the father's

right to save his child.
Thus a right to privacy is relative, making a balancing
approach most appropriate.
"undeniably

warrants

The right of a man in his children

deference

countervailing interest, protection.

and,

absent

a

powerful

In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364,

1374 (Utah 1982), quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651
(1972); 92 S.Ct. at 1208, 1212; 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972).
In

the

J.P.

case

Utah's

Supreme

Court

has

already

undertaken to balance parental rights to their offspring, which
precede

the Constitution,

right.

648 P.2d 1373-1375.

protected

liberty

against

the newly created

The former, said

rights under

United States Constitution.

abortion

Justice Oaks, are

the due process clause of the

Id. at 1375.

Unlike substantive due process cases like Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), which rely on a 'right
of privacy' not mentioned in the Constitution to
establish other rights unknown at common law, the
parental liberty right at issue in this case is
fundamental to the existence of the institution of
the family, which is 'deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition', Moore v. City of
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977)(plurality
opinion) , and in the 'history and culture of
Western civilization."
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 232 (1972). . . . This rooting in
history and the common law validates and limits
the due process protection afforded parental
rights, in contrast to substantive due process
innovations undisciplined by any but abstract
formulae.
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431
U.S. at 503 n. 12.
J.P., 648 P.2d at 1375.
When

the balancing

is undertaken

in a specific

case, courts

should be required to consider that parental rights cannot be
denied

absent

a

"clear

and

convincing

- 12 -

evidence"

standard

to

overcome their rights.

In re Castillo, 632 P.2d 855 (Utah 1981).

Further, there are three interests, not two, to be considered.
Utah has consistently emphasized it has
patriae in children.
In
empowered

See, J.P. , 648 P.2d at 1367.

a divorce

to

make

an interest as parens

case

such

such

division

as

this

one, the court

of property

and

custody determinations as are just and reasonable.
seq.

such

is

child

§§ 30-3-1 et.

The fetus must be either a child or a property right, and

its status as between the parties may properly be determined.
If a father

disputes a decision

to abort, this may

remove the legal decision from the ill-defined area of right to
privacy.
462

Abortion: The Father's Rights, 42 U. Cin. L. Rev. 441,

(1973).

Since private

rights meet private

rights, both

arising from similar sources and both fundamental, the woman's
"right to privacy" as defined in extant abortion cases may not be
relevant.

The father's rights should be seen as about equal to

those of the mother.

Sherain, Beyond Roe and Doe: The Rights of

the Father, 50 Notre Dame lawyer 483, 486 (1975).

The father's

interests and the state's could cumulate to override the mother's
rights.

Id. at 489.
The balancing suggested by the father is necessary due

to

the

wide

variety

of

intentions which may exist.

factual

scenarios,

interests

and

Hopefully society has progressed

beyond using stilted, universally applied assumptions that one
spouse always wins out; the sort of narrow-mindedness loathed by
Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 478 U.S. 52 (1976).

Fathers may assert
could

result

that termination

of the pregnancy

in severe mental distress and possibly emotional

illnessr since he also has a bond with the fetus.
here commentedf
away."

The father

"It feels like a part of me just got thrown

Gurwell, Lawsuit May Have Ended With Abortion, USA Todayf

Thurs. March 31, 1988 p. 3A.

Fathers realize that while they may

or may not have another fathering opportunity, the child aborted
cannot be conceived again.
prevent

his

wife's

Said another father who was unable to

abortion,

"I

was

willing

to

take

full

responsibility and raise it and take care of it; there's nothing
for me to do now but let the wounds heal."

Brannigan, Suits

Argue Fathers1 Rights in Abortion, Wall Street Journal, Tues.,
Aug. 23, 1988, p. 27.
Mothers
involved

for

pregnancy.

also

stress, as have the courts, the trauma

a woman

in the

abortion

decision

and

unwanted

Id.

Fathers may assert interests in procreation, health of
their mate (including future fertility) and the health of their
unborn child.
A mother may be unable financially or emotionally to
meet the needs of the child, as was alleged here.

In such cases

perhaps only a father willing to assume all emotional, physical,
financial and other

responsibilities

(including prenatal care)

would fair well in a balancing of rights and interests.
father

is

assuming

grave

physical,

emotional

and

Such a

financial

burdens likely to last at least eighteen years after birth.

The

mother

and

would

undergo

nine

months

or

more

of

emotional

physical difficulty.

Can those months be said to always outweigh

the eighteen years?
While
likely

a mother

overcome most

with

a special health

fathers'

problem would

interests, if her

reasons are

personal preference and convenience they may not always prevail.

III.

A woman's right to abortion is not absolute.
Clearly Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) held that

the "right of privacy . . . founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's
concept of personal liberty . . .

is broad enough to encompass a

woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."
mother and the American Civil Liberties Union

The

(ACLU) asserted

below an "absolute" constitutional right to abortion.

Faced with

similar claims in amicus briefs. Roe expressly held that "[t]he
privacy right involved . . . cannot be said to be absolute. . . .
[Tlhis right is not unqualified and must be considered against
important state interests and regulation."

410 U.S. at 154.

It

further declared, "Neither in this opinion nor in Doe v. Bolton
do we

discuss the father's

woman's abortion choice.
And

as

indicated

Danforth,

the

Id. at 165 n. 67 [citation omitted].

above,

Court's

rights" if asserted against a

Planned

only

other

Parenthood
case

to

of

Missouri

mention

abortion rights, is not determinative of this case.

v.

fathers'
Like all

cases, Danforth controls only cases factually "on all fours" with
it, or nearly so.
No case has precisely defined the right to privacy or
its scope.

It is a broad concept.

The mother and ACLU have

suggested

it

government

involves

intrusion

a bodily

privacy.

into the body

While

it

is disfavoredf

is true

the rights

exercised here are privatef not governmental acts (as explained
below).

No case stands for the principle that bodily privacy

somehow holds a preferred position in the area of privacy over
associational privacies or is absolutely inviolable.
thus

been

upheld

in

compelling

Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11

vaccinations,

States have
Jacobson

(1905) , participation

v.

in eugenics,

Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), involuntary blood testing,
Schmerber

v.

California,

384

U.S.

757

(1966),

and

blood

transfusion into a fetus over the religious objections of the
mother, Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J.
421, 201 A.2d 537, cert, denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).

IV.

The mother's theory discriminates on account of gender.
Even if Roe were read to suggest an initial presumption

must be made in the woman's favor, it is not an irrebuttable
presumption.

The father also has interests and must have his

chance to raise them.

In fact, since the father's rights are

also fundamental and arise from the same Fourteenth Amendment
roots, the presumption would run both ways, and be offset.
fundamental

rights

cannot

be

summarily

disposed of by the state or court.

and

Such

stereotypically

The Supreme Court held that

Illinois' presumption that illegitimate fathers are uncaring was
an unconstitutional assumption.
If the Constitution compels us to reject the legitimacy
stereotype in that case, on what grounds can it be argued that it

does not compel us to reject the sexual stereotype and require
individual

determinations

scenario?

An

in

the

irrebuttable

father

vs. mother

presumption

in

abortion

favor

of

the

illegitimate mother was struck down explicitly on the basis of
Stanley.

Rothstein v. Lutheran Social Services, 405 U.S. 1051

(1972).

In Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) the Court

simply declared unconstitutional on sex discrimination grounds a
New York law which allowed the mother, but not the unwed father,
to veto the proposed adoption of her children.
not

rely

upon

a

circumstances."

statute

Yet

favoring

the

Danforth1s

extending

The state could
mother

"in

prohibition

of

all
an

absolute one-parent veto to prevent consideration of the father's
interests

here

is

discrimination.

a

"The

strikingly
father

similar

then

has

privileges, duties and powers as the mother.

the

and
same

arbitrary
rights,

In the Interest of

T.E.T., 603 S.W.2d 793, 796 (1980) (referring to adoption).
The mother's desire to abort may be matched by an even
stronger paternal desire for a child.
place here.

Assumptions simply have no

Some fathers, like this one, so want their children

that they are willing to take on all parental responsibilities.
The

Rights

of

the

Father, Notre Dame

Lawyer

50:483, 491-92

(1975) .
The proper
status within
stereotype.
merely

goal must

not be to give women a better

the traditional

stereotype, but to shatter the

Id. at 495.

victories

The "womens rights" cases were not

for women, but

should not be a function of sex.
- 17 -

for

individuals whose rights

Fathers have too often been

victimized

by

sexism.

women's movement.

Ironically

it often

comes

from the

In this case, as Judge Young observed

in

chambers, the father's civil liberties are being overcome by the
American Civil Liberties Union, and in similar
Parenthood111

has

rejected

its

namesake

in

cases "Planned

favor

of

planned

motherhood.
In thousands of waysf in lawf in social mores,
employment pattern, and psychological health, males
are victims, along with womenr of a system that
arbitrarily assigns roles on the basis of sex . . .
[Mlany people now see the issue as one of a more
reasonable and humane allocation of social roles
without regard to sex rather than one as simply
involving women's rights.
Kanowitz, The Male Stake in Women's Liberationy Calif. W. L. Rev.
424, 427 (1972) .
It appears many assume that because the woman bears the
child

physically, her

weight.

interests must always have the greater

The father is, therefor, automatically and categorically

disadvantaged by natural evolution.

The automatic assumption the

woman has the stronger interest is a gender based distinction.
Hafen, B. , The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and
Sexual Privacy; Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81
Mich. L. Rev. 463, 496-501 (1983).

Yet in other categories where

physical distinctions arise from nature, courts are skeptical to
uphold

distinctions

based

thereon.

Courts apply very strict

scrutiny to distinctions based upon sex, race and handicaps.
Utcih

disapproves

matter of public policy.

of

sex

based

classifications

as a

The Utah Constitution provides, "Both

male and female citizens of this State shall enjoy equally all
- 18 -

civil, political and religious rights and privileges."
1.

Under

corresponding

federal

Art. IV §

laws provision a former

law

prescribing a lower age of majority for females than for males
was discriminatory and denied equal protection under the laws.
Stanton v. Stantonf 421 U.S. 7, 95 S.Ct. 1373, 43 L.Ed.2d 688
(1975).

And a preference for mothers over fathers in custody

matters was held to violate that constitutional provision.

Pusey

v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117 (Utah 1986).
And state statute provides:
It is hereby declared that the practice of
discrimination on the basis of . . . sex . . . in
enterprises regulated by the state endangers the
health, safety and general welfare of this state
and its inhabitants; and that such discrimination
. . . violates the public policy of this state.
It is the purpose of [the Civil Rights Act] to
assure all citizens full and equal availability of
all goods, services and
facilities offered by .
. enterprises regulated by the state without
discrimination because of . . . sex . . . .
This
act shall be liberally construed with a view to
promote the policy and purpose of the act and to
promote justice. . . .
§ 13-7-1, UCA 1953. See also, §§ 34-35-1 to 34-35-8, UCA 1953
(Antidiscrimination Act).

How can a court, consistent with the

above act, deny all fathers procreative

rights given to all

mothers?

V.

The mother's theory would frustrate a purpose of marriage.
In Scheinberg

v. Smith, 550 F.Supp.

1112

(1982)

a

federal district court ruled that a father's interest would not
be permanently harmed, by abortion since it was unlikely his wife
would be rendered infertile by abortion.

Based on that, the

court struck down a statute requiring notification of the husband

On appeal the Court of Appeals reversed, Scheinberg v.
Smith, 659 F.2d 476 (1981) , stating:
If either
purposes
nurturing
cooperate
659 F.2d at 485.

partner is to enjoy one of the primary
of marriage, the bringing forth and
of children . . . , each partner must
in matters of childbirth.

The court observed that

[h]er husband has legally committed himself to a
contractual
relationship
that
prohibits
the
extra-marital creation of children.
If his
aspirations include a desire for children, it is a
small concession for him to have the right to know
that his wife is considering an abortion.
The
marital relationship is the only legitimate vehicle
the husband presently has for realizing his
procreative rights.
The husband's ability to
procreate, moreover, is entitled to constitutional
protection. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 62
S.Ct. 1110, tt L.Ed. T533 CT942) .
The state,
therefore, has a compelling interest in requiring a
wife
to
inform
her
husband
when
she
is
contemplating termination of her pregnancy.
659 F.2d at 485.
The court concluded that "[hlaving children is a major purpose of
the institution of marriage.

The state's interest in maintaining

the integrity of this component of marriage is compelling."

659

F.2d at 486-87.
Consideration of the words of a prominent local family
scholar help illustrate the strong expectation a father has in
his children:
Men and women in most cultures have long viewed
their offspring as somehow being an extension of
themselves. . . .
The bearing and raising of
children has probably brought people into contact
with some sense of the Infinite, the mysteries of
the universe, or Nature—however one may express
it—more than any other human experience. Thus,
it is not surprising that common law judges refer
to parental interests as 'sacred,1 natural,' or
fundamental' rights. . . .
- 20 -

Hafenr B.f Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism; Some
Reservations

About

Abandoning

Youth

to

Their

"Rights,"

1976

B.Y.U.L.Rev. 605, 628 (footnotes omitted).
In fact, "the right of the parent, under natural law, to
establish a home and bring up children is a fundamental one and
beyond

the reach

Strasser, 303 NY

of any court."

People ex rel. Portnoy v.

539, 542, 104 NE2d

895, 896

(1952).

recognizes the preeminence of this "natural right".

Utah

In re J.P.,

648 P.2d 1364 (Utah 1982); State in re Jennings, 20 Utah 2d 50,
52; 432 P.2d 879, 880 (1967) .
The integrity of the family unit has found
protection in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Ninth
Amendment.
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 1212, 31
L.Ed.2d 551 (1972) .
The parental right "transcends all property and economic
rights."
of

the

J.P., 648 P.2d at 1373.
family,

threatens"
society.

even

with

the

"Any invasion of the sanctity
loftiest

motives,

unavoidably

the cherished values and traditions of our democratic
Id. at 1376.

"[lit is proper to take alarm at the

first experiment on our liberties."

Madison, J., Memorial and

Remonstrance Against Religious Assessment, 8 The Papers of James
Madison 298, 300 (Rutland & Rachal ed. 1973).
The understandable frustration of a man in the father's
position is well illustrated by the following:
By legislating against procreation outside the
marriage relationship, the state has the power to
make a man totally dependent upon his wife for
legitimate
offspring.
Since the woman by
repeatedly having abortions prevents a man from
- 21 -

procreating
offspring
within
the
marriage
relationship, an infringement of his fundamental
right to a family has occurred.
Poe v. Gernstein, 517 F.2d 787, 790 (1975), citing Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541.

VI.

Fathers are entitled to due process, not a deaf ear.
If a regulation of abortion is found not to impinge on a

woman's decision to have an early abortion the state need show
only a rational relationship to a legitimate purpose.
Carey, 627 F.2d 772 (C.A. 111. 1980).

Charles v.

A regulation that does

unduly burden the abortion decision is not always prohibited, but
merely must be justified by compelling state interests.

Wynn v.

Carey, 599 F.2d 193 (C.A. 111. 1979).
As

noted

in

the

immediately

preceding

section,

protection of the rights of a husband and father to be involved
in abortion decisions may present a compelling state interest.
Scheinberg v. Smith, 659 F.2d 476, 485 (1981).
Similarly, the liberty interest of the father is not
absolutely

protected

against

deprivation without due process.
42:460

(1973) .

deprivation,

only

against

Fathers' Rights, Cinn. L. Rev.

Like the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal

Constitution, Utah's Constitution provides that no "life, liberty
or property" may be denied without "due process of law."
§ 7.

Art. I

The balancing suggested provides both parties their due

process rights.

See also, Art. I § 11, providing that for every

injury the courts shall always be open and provide a remedy.

- 2? -

Quillon v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246r

98 S.Ct. 549, 54

L.Ed.2d 511 stressed the necessity of notice and an opportunity
for

hearing

before

losing

rights

to his

child

in adoption.

Substantial protections of that sort are provided for termination
of

parental

rights

provisions.

in

§

78-3a-48,

UCA

1953f

and

related

Only clear and convincing evidence will suffice.

In

re M.A.V., 736 P.2d 1031 (Utah 1987).

VII.

Utah restricts abortion as a public policy.
As indicated previously, in this case the father's and

husband's interests combine with the interest of the state in
preventing

abortion

where

possible.

In

addition

to

the

requirement the doctor notify the husband of a married woman of
her

abortive

intent, § 76-7-304

UCA 1953, the following are

examples of restrictions and policy statements on point:
A.

Abortion is prohibited on viable fetusesr unless

necessary to preserve the life and health of the mother.

§

76-7-302 UCA 1953. And even then the procedure used must be that
which will give the unborn child the best chance of survival.
76-7-307 UCA 1953.

§

The physician must employ all his medical

skills to save the child if it has "any reasonable possibility of
survival outside of the mother's womb."
B.

§ 76-7-308 UCA 1953.

Abortion procedures may not be designed to kill or

injure the unborn child unless necessary for the mother's life or
health.

§ 76-7-307 UCA 1953.
C.

The state's declared policy is to "encourage all

persons to respect the right to life of all others, regardless of

agey

development,

handicapped
1953.

condition

or

dependency,

persons and all unborn persons."

including

all

§ 78-11-23 UCA

Note that unborn humans are "persons" under Utah law.

Id.

See also §§ 78-11-24 and 25 UCA 1953.
D.

Criminal Homicide includes killing an unborn child.

"A person commits criminal homicide if he

. . .

causes the

death of another human being, including an unborn child [except
for legal abortions]."
E.

§ 76-5-201(1) UCA 1953.

Utah favors strengthening, not destroying, familial

relationships.

"It

is the policy

of the

state of

Utah to

strengthen the family life foundation of our society and . . . to
protect the rights of children."

VIII.

§ 30-3-11.1, UCA 1953.

Hootness should not prevent this appeal.
The abortion in this case was within minutes after this

Court issued its temporary restraining order, but before it was
served upon the mother.
order

was

dissolved,

Right after the lower court's similar

and

knowing

the

father

was

seeking

an

immediate interlocutory appeal, counsel for the mother was quoted
as

saying

possible.
161SEST.

his

client

Mitchell,

would

secure

Associated

an

Press

abortion
feed

as

soon

as

AP-NY-03-19-88

See also, Thompson, Utah man will appeal abortion

decision, Deseret News, Mon., May 9, 1988, p. Bl.

The close

timing in this and other cases illustrates the need for guidance
from this court to avoid loss of rights without due process.
As a British legal scholar pointed out, "Babies, like the
tide, waiteth for no man, and certainly will not wait until a
decision is reached."

Kennedy, Husband Denied a Say in Abortion

Since the pregnancy has terminated, this case
would ordinarily be moot. • . . We think because
the subject that will likely arise again and
again, the public interest will be best served if
we address the merits of the matter, thus
affording some guidance to litigants and trial
courts. . . .
Coleman v. Coleman, 471 A.2d 1115, 1117 (Md.App. 1984).
Where the technically moot matter is of 'wide
concern, affects the public interest, is likely to
recur in a similar manner, and , because of the
brief time any one person is affected, would
otherwise likely escape judicial review. . .',
it is justiciable. In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1371 (Utah 1982).

IX.

This is a private action to enforce private rightsr not

•state action1, so constitutional abortion cases do not apply.

A.

The United States Constitution limits the actions of

government.
Because the United States Constitution was created to
limit and regulate the exercise of governmental power by the
states

and

federal

constitutional

law

government,
in

cases

at

the

application

law

depends

of

federal

on whether

the

exercise of governmental power is at issue.
All

of

the

cases

the

mother

believes

give her

an

unfettered right to an abortion notwithstanding the wishes of her
husband, the father

of the child, involve actions of states

through legislative enactments.
479,

14

forbidding

L.Ed.2d

510,

85

Griswald v. Connecticut,

S.Ct.1678

(1965)

(State

381 US
statute

distribution of contraceptive materials to married

couples found unconstitutional); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,

31 L.Ed 349, 92 S.Ct. 1029 (1972) (State statute forbidding sale
of

contraceptive

materials

to

unmarried

persons

found

unconstitutional); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 , 93 S.
Ct.705, rehearing denied 410 U.S. 959, 35 L.Ed.2d 694, 93 S.Ct.1409
(1973) (State abortion statute found unconstitutional);

Planned

Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976)
(State

statute

requiring

husband's

consent

for

wife

to have

abortion ruled unconstitutional); Doe v. Rampton, 366 F.Supp. 189
(D. Utah

1975)

aff'd

535 F2d

1219

(10th

Cir. 1975);

(State

statute requiring husband's consent for wife to have abortion
invalidated).

B.

This father is a private actor, not a governmental

entity.
The father was not trying to enforce a state statute
when he sought to enjoin his wife's abortion.

He sought to

utilize the court system as a neutral forum to settle a private
dispute with his wife concerning the disposition of their unborn
child.

He requested and was denied the opportunity to put on

evidence as to whether his claim to have the child born alive
should prevail over
aborted.

any right of his wife to have the child

Instead the court ruled against him as a matter of law,

not based on individualized facts.
The father has not been assisted by any governmental
entity in bringing this action.

Neither has he brought this

action at the behest of any governmental entity.

His motives

were entirely personal; namely, his natural parental concern over
the well h^inn

nf h i e

r«v» «i i A

To counter the father's claim of private action, the
mother cites the old case of Shelley v. Kraemerf 334 US 1 (1948) f
which stated that under its facts the enlistment of the courts
can turn a private action

into government action because the

judiciary

government.

is

a branch

of

But Shelley

actually

reaffirms that the only action inhibited by constitutional rights
is "such action as may fairly be said to be that of the States."
334 U.S. at 13.

C.

Shelley

is

factually

uniquer

and

the

'judicial

action as state action' rule can not be universally applied.
Under a very broad reading of Shelly v. Kraemerf all
litigation becomes state action on the part of the plaintiff.
334 U.S. 1 (1948).
that

aspect

of

Such a result should give cause to ask whether
Shelley

should

not

be

examined

and

perhaps

confined to the facts of the case.
Shelley

involved

enforcement

of covenants

the sale of property on the basis of race.

restricting

The contract involved

flew in the face of the fundamental right to be free of racial
discrimination.

It

also

was

contrary

favoring free alienability of realty.
enforcement

of private

contracts.

to

the public

policy

On the other side was the
While the

law favors the

enforcement of contracts validly made, courts of this state can
refuse enforcement on the grounds that the contract would violate
public policy.
1949) .

Frailey v. McGarry, 211 P.2d

840, 847

(Utah

Shelley v. Kraemer thus becomes a case of a fundamental

right opposing an interest that is valid only so long as it does

not violate public policy.
public policy

D.

The case should be limited to its

significance.

Fathers1 constitutionally protected rights in their

children constitute powerful public policy.
As

discussed

above

in

Section

constitutional rights to their children.

IIf

fathers

have

On both a federal and a

Utah level, these rights are supported by the most basic, strong
public policy.

Quillon v. Walcottr 434 U.S. 246 (1978); In re

J.P., 648 P.2d 1364 (Utah 1982).

E.

Use of Shelley v. Kraemer to close courts to a case

of opposing
question

fundamental

is

fundamental

whether
interest

rights

Shelley

itself violates Shelley.
v.

Kraemer,

on the one hand

and

which

involved

a covenant

trial

court

to hear

evidence and weigh

father denied him due process.
becomes

state

a

against

public policy on the other hand, should govern this case,
involves fundamental rights on both sides.

The

which

The refusal of the

the interests of the

A refusal of the court to act

action, violative

of Shelley

v. Kraemer.

result is a hopeless tangle unless we back away from Shelley

The
in

cases involving constitutional interests on both sides.
The High Court itself has wisely backed away from Shelley
v. Kraemer.

In the "Baconsfield" controversy, a will left land

to the city of Macon, Georgia to be used as a park for whites
only.

In Evans v. Newtonf 382 US 296 (1966), the Supreme Court

held that the city could not constitutionally maintain the park
- 28 -

as segregated.

The state courts then determined that the land

should revert to the heirs of the testator rather than be used
contrary to the provisions of the will.
clearly enforcing a discriminatory intent.

The state courts were
The case was appealed

to the U.S. Supreme Court, which, in Evans v. Abbney, 396 U.S. 435
(1970)f declined to disturb the state court holding even though
it was enforcing a will provision that was clearly racist.
judicial enforcement was not found to involve state action.
case did not

F.

Such
The

even involve a fundamental interest on both sides.

The interests of society demand that a forum be

available to resolve disputes between parties.
Our system of law calls for the settlement of disputes
in an ordered courtroom rather than by resort to self help.

No

reasonable person could deny that a father has an interest in his
unborn child.

But if Shelley v. Kraemer blocks a father's entry

into a courthouse to weigh his interest against the interest of
his wife, what

options are then available to him?

Are the

interests of society met by locking fathers of unborn children
out

of

courtroom

purely

on

the basis

of

gender?

The Utah

Constitution provides for the courts to be open to every person,
and require a remedy for every injury.

G.

Art. I, § 11.

Cases of this sort involving unborn children are

best handled within the context of divorce court.

The Utah Code empowers the courts of

this state in

divorce actions to make equitable orders relating to children and
the parties.

§ 30-3-5, UCA 1953.

Because the father is

private

party asserting a personal rightf there was no cause to involve
constitutional cases in making a decision.

Absent

controlling

cases or statutef the court should have balanced the interests of
the parties and made a determination.
The District

Court, which

is Utah's family court (§

30-3-11.1 et. seq.) is an appropriate forum for such disputes,
and has abundant experience in resolving highly charged domestic
conflicts.

VIII.

Court support for Roe v. Wade is eroding.
Since Roe v. Wade was decided in 1973 by a 7-2 margin,

its support on the Court has declined.

The case was reaffirmed

in 1983 in Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,
U.S.

416

(1983), by

Thornburgh

v.

a

6-3

American

margin.
College

Gynecologists, 106 S.Ct. 2169 (1986).

The
of

tally

was

5-4

Obstetricians

462
in
and

Since then Justice Powell,

one of the Thornburgh majority, has left the Court.
Griswald v. Connecticut, the case from which the privacy
rights in Roe originated, has also come under fire.

In a 1986

5-4 decision, the court said "[Tlhe court is most vulnerable and
comes

nearest

to

illegitimacy

when

it deals with

judge-made

constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the
language or design of the Constitution." Bowers v. Hardwick, 106
S.Ct 2841 (1986).

See Reidinger, Will Roe v. Wade Be Overturned,

A.B.A.J.f July lf 1988, at 66.

Justice Oaks of our Supreme Court

has pointed out that the Roe discovery of "rights" comes not from
the Constitution's languagef but from elsewhere.
P.2d

1364, 1375

according

to

"emanate"

from

Rights.

(Utah

Justice

1982).
Douglas,

various

Their

source

"zones"

specific

In re J.P., 648

and

seems to be,

"penumbras"

protections

in

the

that

Bill of

Griswald v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Griswald1 s right to privacy was held not to extend to

private homosexual conduct.

Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S.Ct. 2841

(1986).
Recently, Justice Blackmun, the author of the Roe v.
Wade opinion, said to a law school audience

in Little Rock,

Arkansas recentlyr "Will Roe v. Wade go down the drain?

I think

there"s a very distinct possibility that it will— this term."
Mauro, Blackmun sees switch on abortion, USA Today, Sept. 14,
1988, p. Al.
opinion,

Mr.

As a member of the Court, and as author of the
Justice

Blackmun's

comment

certainly

provides

insight as to the erosion of the Roe majority.
One of Roe's weaknesses is its fatal dependence on 1973
medical technology, on which it based its arbitrary "trimester"
system.

Fundamental constitutional questions should not rise or

fall with mankind's transitory knowledge.
0'Conner
competing

to

comment

interests

that
of

Roe's

That has led Justice

mechanism

mother

and

state

for
is

weighing

the

"completely

unworkable", and that Roe is "clearly on a collision course with
itself."

Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S.

416 (1983), O'Conner, J. dissenting.

The collision is the result

of improvements in medicine that make abortions safer but also

make it possible to save fetal lives at ever younger ages.

The

Justice noted that first-trimester viability may be possible in
the not-distant future.

Id.

Roe used "viability" to determine when unborn children
may be protected, suggesting 28 weeks as the dividing line.

As

indicated above, Utah physicians are required to try to preserve
lives of premature infants, including the victims of abortion.
See §§ 76-7-302, 76-7-307 (must employ medical skills to save the
child

with

76-7-307

reasonable

possibility

of survival) , 76-7-308 and

(abortion procedures may not be designed to kill or

injure the unborn child), UCA 1953.

A recent Readers1 Digest

article chronicled the successful efforts to save an infant born
at 22 weeks, still solidly within the second trimester.
who would, under

the definition of many

The boy

in the "pro-choice"

movement, be a nonhuman fetus for weeks after his live birth, is
now a happy five year old with only an eye disorder.

A two year

old study showed about 20 percent of infants born at the 24th
week of pregnancy survive.

25 Clinical Pediatrics 391 (1986) .

IX. CONCLUSION
Society is finally recognizing that a father's role in
his children goes much deeper than finances.

To hold that case

law disallows consideration of the father's interest when faced
with

the prospect

of destruction

of his unborn would

be an

unacceptable throw-back to times when children were a man's mere
chattel.

A close look at all the abortion cases reveals this is

a first impression case without controlling precedent.

The

Court

should

recognize

the

fundamental

constitutional rights of both parents in their childrenf and at
least grant the father notice and an opportunity to be heard and
have his interests weighed against those of his co-equal partner
in procreation.
The

Roe

line

of

cases

have

unfortunately

not

yet

expressly recognize the interests the father has in his unborn
child.

It is high time that recognition began, and this case

provides the vehicle.
Appellant requests that the Court define fathers' rights
as guidance to future courtsf litigants and parents.

Respectfully so requested this seventh day of October,
1988.

Mitchell R. Barker
Evan R. Hurst
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the seventh day of October, 1988,
I caused to be hand delivered or mailed, postage prepaid, four
true and correct copies of the foregoing to:

David S. Dolowitz, Esq.
Michael S. Evans
Julie A. Bryan
Cohne Rappaport & Segal
525 East 100 South
Fifth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Attorneys for Defendant/
Respondent
Mitchell R. Barker
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ADDENDA
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
AND
SECTIONS FOR UTAH CODE

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

AMEND. XII

AMENDMENT VI
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and
to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence.
AMENDMENT VII
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the
United States, than according to the rules of the common law.
AMENDMENT VIII
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.
AMENDMENT IX
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.
AMENDMENT X
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people.
The first ten Amendments were proposed by the first Congress and were ratified
as follows: New Jersey, Nov. 20, 1789; Maryland, Dec. 19, 1789; North Carolina,
Dec. 2:2, 1789; South Carolina, Jan. 19, 1790; New Hampshire, Jan. 25, 1790; Delaware,
Jan. 28, 1790; Pennsylvania, Mar. 10, 1790; New York, March 27, 1790; Rhode Island,
June 15, 1790; Vermont, Nov. 3, 1791; Virginia, Dec. 15, 1791. Connecticut, Georgia
and Massachusetts ratified them on April 19, 1939, March 18, 1939 and March 2, 1939,
respectively.

AMENDMENT XI
The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one
of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
History: Proposed by Congress on Sep- fied by the legislatures of three-fourths
tember 5, 1794; declared to have been rati- of all the states on January 8, 1798.

AMENDMENT XII
The Electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote by ballot
for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an
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CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

AMEND. XIV, § 5

AMENDMENT XIV
Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
Section 2.
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons
in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote
at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President
of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and
Judicial OfiScers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is
denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years
of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except
for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation
therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male
citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years
of age in such State.
Section 3.
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector
of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under
the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken
an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States,
or as a member of any State legislature or as an executive or judicial
officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States,
shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given
aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of twothirds of each House, remove such disability.
Section 4.
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by
law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for
services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned.
But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt
or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the
United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave;
but all such debts, obligations, and claims shall be held illegal and void.
Section 5.
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of this article.
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ART. I, § 7

CONSTITUTION OP UTAH

Gun control laws, validity and construction of, 28 A. L. R. 3d 845.
Law Reviews.
The Constitutional Right to Keep and

Bear Atms, Lucilius A. Emery, 28 H a r v .
L. Rev. 473.
Restrictions on the Right To Le;ir A n n s
— S t a t e and Federal Firearms Legislation,
98 U. P a . L. Rev. 905.

Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of 1 ife, liberty or property, without due
process of law.
Comparable Provision.
Montana Const., Art. I l l , § 27.
Cross-Reference.
Eminent domain
seq.

generally, 78-34-1 et

In general.
"Due process of l a w " comes to us from
the Great Charter and is synonymous with
"law of the land." I t means t h a t a p a r t y
shall have his day in court—trial. Jensen
v. Union P a c . Rv. Co., G U. 253, 21 P . 994,
4 L. R. A. 724.
Due process of law is not necessarily
judicial process. People v. Hasbrouck, 11
U. 291, 39 P . 918.
J u d g m e n t against defendant, not served
with process and not appearing either in
person or by attorney, would not be due
process of law. Blvth & F a r g o Co. v.
Swenson, 15 U. 345, "49 P . 1027.
I t is elementary t h a t there can be no
judicial action affecting vested rights t h a t
is not based upon some process or notice
whereby the interested parties are brought
within the jurisdiction of the judicial
tribunal about to render judgment. P a r r y
v. Bonneville I r r . Dist., 71 U. 202, 263 P .
751.
"Due process of l a w " requires t h a t , before one can be bound by a j u d g m e n t
affecting his property rights, some process
must be served upon him which in some
degree at least is calculated to give him
notice. N a i s b i t t v. Herrick, 7G U. 575,
290 P . 950.
Due process of law requires t h a t notice
be given to the persons whose rights are
to be affected. I t hears before it condemns, proceeds upon inquiry, and renders
judgment only after trial. Riggins v. District Court of Salt L a k e County, 89 U.
183, 51 P . 2d 645.
The phrase "due process of l a w " apparently originated with Lord Coke, who defined the terms. Many a t t e m p t s have been
made to further define due process of law,
but all of them resolve into the thought
that a p a r t y shall have his day in court.
Christiansen v. H a r r i s , 109 U. 1, 163 P .
2d 314.
In depriving a person of life or liberty, the essentials of due process a r e :
( a ) the existence of a competent person,

body, or agency authorized by law to determine the questions; (b) an inquiry
into the merits of the question by such
person, body or agency; (c) notice to the
person of the inauguration and purpose
of the inquiry and the time at which
such person should appear if he wishes
to be h e a r d ; (d) right to appear in person or by counsel; (e) fair opportunity
to submit evidence, examine and crossexamine witnesses; (f) judgment to be
rendered upon the record thus made. In
the absence of s t a t u t e laying down other
or more specific requirements, the above
conditions meet the demands of due
process. In the absence of specific provisions to the contrary, due process does
not require t h a t any or all of these
requirements must be in writing or in
any particular form. In the interests of
orderly procedure and certainty as to its
proceedings and action taken, any legally
constituted body or agency should as far
as practical have written records of all
proceedings before it, except where otherwise provided bv law. Christiansen v.
H a r r i s , 109 U. 1, 163 P. 2d 314.
I n the trial of criminal cases the statutes prescribe certain rules of procedure,
which must be substantially complied with
to keep the proceedings within the due
processes of the law. A somewhat different set of rules is prescribed in civil
cases and in special proceedings. Some
rules, affecting all types, are not found in
the s t a t u t e s , but in t h a t great basic body
of the law commonly known as the decisions or rules of the courts. But all these
methods and means provided for the protection and enforcement of human rights
have t h e same basic requirements—that
no p a r t y can be affected by such action,
until his legal rights have been the subject of an inquiry by a person or body
authorized by law to determine such
rights, of which inquiry the party has due
notice, and at which he had an opportunity to be heard and to give evidence as
to his rights or defenses. Christiansen v.
H a r r i s , 109 U. 1, 163 P . 2d 314.
While normally we think of "due process of l a w " as requiring judicial action,
yet "due process" is not necessarily judicial action. Christiansen v. Harris, 109
IT. 1, 163 P . 2d 314.
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ART. I, § 11

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Deficiency judgment, right to jury trial
of issues as to, 112 A. L. R. 1492.
Driving while intoxicated or similar
offense,-right to trial by jury in criminal
prosecution for, 16 A. L. B. 3d 1373.
Fingerprint, palm print, or bare footprint evidence as violating right to jurv
trial, 28 A. L. R. 2d 1141.
Garnishment; issues in garnishment as
triable to court or to jury, 19 A. L. R.
3d 1393.
Indoctrination by court of persons summoned for jury service as violation of
right to jury trial, 89 A. L. R. 2d 215.
Interlocutory ruling of one judge on
right to jury trial as binding on another
judge in same case, 132 A. L. R. 68.
Juvenile court delinquency proceedings,
right to jury trial in, 100 A.*L. R. 2d 1241.
Mandamus or prohibition as remedy to
enforce right to jury trial, 41 A. L. R.
2d 780.
Provisions for determining custody or
commitment of juvenile delinquents without jury trial as denial of due process,
100 A. L. R. 2d 1241.
Removal of public officer, right to jury
trial in proceedings for, 3 A. L. R. 232,
8 A. L. R. 1476.
Right in equity suit to jury trial of
counterclaim involving legal issue, 17 A.
L. R. 3d 1321.
Right to consent to trial of criminal
case before twelve jurors, 70 A. L. R.
279, 105 A. L. R. 1114.
Right to jury trial as to fact essential
to action or defense but not involving
merits thereof, 170 A. L. R. 383.
Right to jury trial in action under Fair
Labor Standards Act, 174 A. L. R. 421.
Right to jury trial in disbarment proceedings, 107 A. L. R. 692.

Right to jury trial in proceeding to determine insanity or incompetency, 33 A.
L. R. 2d 1145.
Right to jury trial in suit to remove
cloud, quiet title, or determine adverse
claims, 117 A. L. R. 9.
Seizure of property alleged to be illegallv used, right to jury trial, 17 A. L.
R. 568, 50 A. L. R. 97'.
Substitution of judge: right to jury
trial as violated by substitution in criminal case, 83 A. L / R . 2d 1032*
Validity of statute allowing for separation of'jury, 34 A. L. R. 1128, 79 A. L.
R. 821, 21 A. L. R. 2d 1088.
Waiver of jury trial in criminal cases
and effect thereof on jurisdiction of court,
48 A. L. R. 767, 58 A. L. R. 1031.
Law Reviews.
The Supreme Court: 1969 Term, Michael
E. Tigar, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 165.
New Data on the Effect of a "Death
Qualified Jury" on the Guilt Determination Process, George L. Jurow, 84 Harv.
L. Rev. 567.
Jury Trial in Civil Cases, Glen W.
Clark, 10 Mont. L. Rev. 38.
Right to Trial by Jury in State Court
Prosecutions, 22 S. L. J. 875.
Right to Civil Jury Trial in Utah: Constitution and Statute, Ronan E. Degnan,
8 Utah L. Rev. 97.
Due Process Standard of Jury Impartiality Precludes Death-Qualification of
Jurors in Capital Cases, 1969 Utah L. Rev.
154.
No-Fault Automobile Insurance in Utah
—State Constitutional Issues, 1970 Utah
L. Rev. 248.

Sec. 11. [Courts open—Redress of injuries.]
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him
in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course
of law, which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay;
and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before
any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which
he is a party.
Comparable Provision.
Montana Const., Art. I H , § 6.
Actions by court.
Court of equity has jurisdiction to open
probate proceeding and to proceed against
bond of administratrix where she haa
practiced extrinsic fraud on the court.
Weyant v. Utah Savings & Trust Co., 54
U. 181, 182 P. 189, 9 A. L. R. 1119.

Actions by state.
This section did not alter the law with
respect to certain rights which are vested
in the state, which alone can exercise
sovereign powers; therefore, it does not
prevent the state from reserving to itself
the sole right to bring actions for the
dissolution of building and loan associations. Union Savings & Investment Co. v.
District Court of Salt Lake County, 44
U. 397, 140 P. 221, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 821.
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13-7-1

COMMERCE AND TRADE

13-7-1. Policy and purposes of act.
It is hereby declared that the practice of discrimination on the basis of race,
color, sex, religion, ancestry, or national origin in business establishments or
places of public accommodation or in enterprises regulated by the state endangers the health, safety, and general welfare of this state and its inhabitants;
and that such discrimination in business establishments or places of public
accommodation or in enterprises regulated by the state, violates the public
policy of this state. It is the purpose of this act to assure all citizens full and
equal availability of all goods, services and facilities offered by business establishments and places of public accommodation and enterprises regulated by
the state without discrimination because of race, color, sex, religion, ancestry,
or national origin. The rules of common law that statutes in derogation
thereof shall be strictly construed has no application to this act. This act shall
be liberally construed with a view to promote the policy and purposes of the
act and to promote justice. The remedies provided herein shall not be exclusive but shall be in addition to any other remedies available at law or equity.
History: L. 1965, ch. 174, § 1; 1973, ch. 18,
§ 1.
Meaning of "this act". — The term "this
act" refers to Laws 1965, ch. 174, which
enacted this section and §§ 13-7-2 to 13-7-4.

Cross-References. — Utah Anti-Discrimination Act, §§ 34-35-1 to 34-35-8.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Note: State Legislative Response to the Federal Civil Rights Act:
A Proposal, 9 Utah L. Rev. 434.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 15 Am. Jur. 2d Civil Rights
§ 16 et seq.
C.J.S. — 14 C.J.S. Civil Rights §§ 6-11,
14-21.
A.L.R. — Actionability under state statutes
of discrimination because of complaining
party's association with persons of different
race, color, or the like, 35 A.L.R.3d 859.
Discrimination on basis of illegitimacy as denial of constitutional rights, 38 A.L.R.3d 613.
Constitutionality of enactment or regulation
forbidding or restricting employment of aliens
in public employment or on public works, 38
A.L.R.3d 1213.
Recovery of damages for emotional distress
resulting from racial, ethnic, or religious abuse
or discrimination, 40 A.L.R.3d 1290.
Construction and operation of "equal opportunity clause" requiring pledge against racial
discrimination in hiring under construction
contract, 44 A.L.R.3d 1283.
Racial or religious discrimination in furnishing of public utilities, services, or facilities, 53
A.L.R.3d 1027.
Validity in application of provisions governing determination of residency for purpose of
fixing fee differential for out-of-state students
in public college, 56 A.L.R.3d 641.

Recovery of damages for emotional distress
resulting from discrimination because of sex or
marital status, 61 A.L.R.3d 944.
Trailer park as place of public accommodation within meaning of state civil rights statutes, 70 A.L.R.3d 1142.
Recovery of damages as remedy for wrongful
discrimination under state or local civil rights
provisions, 85 A.L.R.3d 351.
State law prohibiting sex discrimination as
violated by dress or grooming requirements for
customers of establishments serving food or
beverages, 89 A.L.R.3d 7.
Prohibition, under state civil rights laws, of
racial discrimination in rental of privately
owned residential property, 96 A.L.R.3d 497.
Identification of job seeker by race, religion,
national origin, sex, or age, in "situation
wanted" employment advertising as violation
of state civil rights laws, 99 A.L.R.3d 154.
On-the-job sexual harassment as violation of
state civil rights law, 18 A.L.R.4th 328.
What constitutes illegal discrimination under state statutory prohibition against discrimination in housing accommodations on account
of marital status, 33 A.L.R.4th 964.
Race as factor in adoption proceedings, 34
A.L.R.4th 167.
Exclusion or expulsion from association or
club as violation of state civil rights act, 38
A.L.R.4th 628.
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DIVORCE

30-3-1

30-3-5.

Disposition of property - Maintenance and health care of parties and children —
Court to have continuing jurisdiction — Custody and visitation — Termination
of alimony.
30-3-6.
Interlocutory decree.
30-3-7.
When decree becomes absolute.
30-3-8.
Remarriage — When unlawful.
30-3-9.
Repealed.
30-3-10.
Custody of children.
30-3-11.
Repealed.
30-3-11.1. Family Court Act — Purpose.
30-3-11.2. Family Court Act — Appointment of counsel for child.
30-3-12.
Family Court Act — Courts to exercise family counseling powers.
30-3-13.
Repealed.
30-3-13.1. Family Court Act — Establishment of family court division of district court.
30-3-14.
Repealed.
30-3-14.1. Family Court Act — Designation of judges — Terms.
30-3-15.
Repealed.
30-3-15.1. Family Court Act — Appointment of domestic relations counselors, family court
commissioner, and assistants and clerks.
30-3-15.2. Family Court Act — Domestic relations counselors — Powers.
30-3-15.3. Family Court Act — Commissioners — Powers.
30-3-15.4. Family Court Act — Salaries and expenses.
30-3-16.
Repealed.
30-3-16.1. Family Court Act — Jurisdiction of family court division — Powers.
30-3-16.2. Family Court Act — Petition for conciliation.
30-3-16.3. Family Court Act — Contents of petition.
30-3-16.4. Family Court Act — Procedure upon filing of petition.
30-3-16.5. Family Court Act — Fees.
30-3-16.6. Family Court Act — Information not available to public.
30-3-16.7. Family Court Act — Effect of petition — Pendency of action.
30-3-17.
Family Court Act — Power and jurisdiction of judge.
30-3-17.1. Family Court Act — Proceedings deemed confidential — Written evaluation by
counselor.
30-3-18.
Waiting period for hearing after filing for divorce — Use of counseling service
not to be construed as condonation.
30-3-19 to 30-3-22. Repealed.

30-3-1. Procedure — Residence — Grounds. Proceedings in divorce
shall be commenced and conducted in the manner provided by law for proceedings in civil causes, except as hereinafter provided, and the court may
decree a dissolution of the marriage contract between the plaintiff and
defendant in all cases where the plaintiff or defendant shall have been an
actual and bona fide resident of this state and of the county where the
action is brought or as to members of the armed forces of the United
States who are not legal residents of this state, where the plaintiff shall
have been stationed in this state under military orders, for three months
next prior to the commencement of the action, for any of the following
causes:
(1) Impotency of the defendant at the time of marriage.
(2) Adultery committed by the defendant subsequent to marriage.
(3) Willful desertion of the plaintiff by the defendant for more than
one year.
(4) Willful neglect of the defendant to provide for the plaintiff the common necessaries of life.
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HUSBAND AND WIFE

(5) Habitual drunkeness of the defendant.
(6) Conviction of the defendant for felony.
(7) Cruel treatment of the plaintiff by the defendant to the extent of
causing bodily injury or great mental distress to the plaintiff.
(8) When the husband and wife have lived separate and apart under
a decree of separate maintenance of any state for three consecutive years
without cohabitation; provided that a decree of divorce granted upon this
ground shall not affect the liability of either party under any provision
for separate support and maintenance, if any, theretofore granted.
(9) Permanent insanity of the defendant; provided, that no divorce shall
be granted on the grounds of insanity unless, (a) the defendant shall have
been duly and regularly adjudged to be insane by the legally constituted
authorities of this or some other state prior to the commencement of the
action, and unless, (b) it shall appear to the satisfaction of the court by
the testimony of competent witnesses that the insanity of the defendant
is incurable. In all such actions the court shall appoint for the defendant
a guardian ad litem, who shall take such measures as may be necessary
and proper to protect the interests of the defendant, and a copy of the summons and complaint must be duly served on the defendant in person, or
by publication, as provided for by the laws of this state in other actions
for divorce, or upon his guardian ad litem, and upon the county attorney
for the county in which such action is prosecuted. It shall be the duty of
such county attorney to make an investigation into the merits of the case,
and, if the defendant resides out of this state, to have a commission issued
to take such depositions as are necessary for that purpose, to attend the
court upon the trial of the cause and make such defense therein as may
be just and proper to protect the rights of the defendant and the interests
of the state. In all such actions the court and judge thereof shall have all
powers relative to the payment of alimony, the distribution of property and
the custody and maintenance of minor children which such courts and
judges may possess in other actions for divorce. Either the plaintiff or
defendant shall, if the defendant resides in this state, upon proper notice,
be entitled to have the defendant brought into the court upon the trial,
or to have an examination of the defendant by two or more competent physicians, to determine the mental condition of the defendant, and for such
purpose either party may have process from the court to enter any asylum
or institution where such defendant may be confined. The costs of court
in such action shall be assessed or apportioned by the court according to
the equities of the case.
History: R.S. 1898, § 1208; L. 1903, ch. 43,
§ 1; C.L. 1907, § 1208; C.L. 1917, § 2995; L.
1929, ch. 93, § 1; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 40-3-1;
L. 1943, ch. 46, § 1; 1955, ch. 45, § 1; 1965, ch.
57, § 1; 1969, ch. 72, § 1.

Compiler's Notes.
Analogous former statutes, 2 Comp. Laws
iggg, § 2602.
Th e 1903 amendment added subsec. (9).
The 1929 amendment inserted requirement
of one year's residence in the state and three
months' residence in the county.
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HUSBAND AND WIFE

Power of court to vacate decree of divorce
or separation upon request of both parties, 3
ALR 3d 1216.
Prayer to impress trust upon property or
otherwise settle property rights, propriety of
inclusion in bill for divorce or annulment, 93
ALR 327.

Standing of strangers to divorce proceeding to attack validity of divorce decree, 12 ALR 2d 717.
Sufficiency of allegation of adultery in suit
for divorce, 2 ALR 1621.
Vacating or setting aside divorce decree
after remarriage of party, 17 ALR 4th 1153.

30-3-5. Disposition of property - Maintenance and health care of
parties and children — Court to have continuing jurisdiction — Custody and visitation — Termination of alimony. (1) When a decree of
divorce is rendered, the court may include in it such orders in relation to
the children, property and parties, and the maintenance and health care
of the parties and children, as may be equitable. The court shall include
in every decree of divorce an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses of the
dependent children. If coverage is available at a reasonable cost, the court
may also include an order requiring the purchase and maintenance of
appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for those children.
The court shall have continuing jurisdiction to make such subsequent
changes or new orders with respect to the support and maintenance of the
parties, the custody of the children and their support, maintenance, and
health and dental care, or the distribution of the property as shall be reasonable and necessary. Visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and
other relatives shall take into consideration the welfare of the child.
(2) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order
of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse shall automatically terminate upon the remarriage of that former spouse, unless that
marriage is annulled and found to be void ab initio, in which case alimony
shall resume, providing that the party paying alimony be made a party
to the action of annulment and that party's rights are determined.
(3) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse
shall be terminated upon application of that party establishing that the
former spouse is residing with a person of the opposite sex, unless it is
further established by the person receiving alimony that the relationship
or association between them is without any sexual contact.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1212; L. may be made by the court with respect to the
1909, ch. 109, § 4; C.L. 1917, § 3000; R.S. 1933 disposal of the children or the distribution of
& C. 1943, 40-3-5; L. 1969, ch. 72, § 3; 1975, ch. property as shall be reasonable and proper."
The 1975 amendment added the last sen81, § 1; 1979, ch. 110, § 1; 1984, ch. 13, § 1.
tence of subsec. (1).
Compiler's Notes.
The 1979 amendment added subsecs. (2)
Analogous former statutes, Comp. Laws and (3).
1876, § 1155; 2 Comp. Laws 1888, § 2606.
The 1984 amendment substituted "include
The 1969 amendment deleted a provision in it" for "make" in the first sentence of
that children ten years of age and of sound subsec. (1); inserted the second and third senmind have the privilege of selecting the par- tences in subsec. (1); inserted "and health
ent to which they will attach themselves; and and dental care" in the fourth sentence of
substituted the fourth sentence of subsec. (1) subsec. (1); and made minor changes in
for "Such subsequent changes or new orders phraseology and punctuation.
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in, or pendency of, proceedings in habeas corpus for custody of child, 110 ALR 745.
Jurisdiction of trial or appellate court in
respect of custody of children pending appeal
from order or decree in divorce suit, 163 ALR
1319.
Jurisdiction to award custody of child domiciled in state but physically outside of it, 9
ALR 2d 434.
Jurisdiction to award custody of child having legal domicile in another state, 4 ALR 2d
7.
Maternal preference rule or presumption
in child custody cases, modern status, 70
ALR 3d 262.
Mental health of contesting parent as factor in award of child custody, 74 ALR 2d
1073.
Mother's right to custody of child as
affected by father's contract with third person, 38 ALR 222.
Necessity of requiring presence in court of
both parties in proceedings relating to custody or visitation of children, 15 ALR 4th
864.
Nonresidence as affecting one's right to
custody of child, 15 ALR 2d 432.
Order in divorce or separation proceeding
concerning removal of child from jurisdiction, and award of custody to nonresident,
154 ALR 552.
Physical abuse of child by parent as
ground for termination of parent's right to
child, 53 ALR 3d 605.
Physical disability or handicap of parent
as factor in custody award or proceedings, 3
ALR 4th 1044.
Power of court to modify the provisions of
its decree respecting custody of child as
affected by absence of parent or child from
its territorial jurisdiction, 70 ALR 526.
Power of court which denied divorce, legal
separation, or annulment, to award custody
or make provisions for support of child, 7
ALR 3d 1096.

30-3-11.1

Private interview with child in determining custody, propriety of court conducting, 99
ALR 2d 954.
Psychiatric or mental examination for
party seeking to obtain or retain custody of
child, right to require, 99 ALR 3d 268.
Race as factor in custody award or proceedings, 10 ALR 4th 796.
Religion as factor in child custody and visitation cases, 22 ALR 4th 971.
Remarriage as ground for modification of
divorce as to custody of child, 43 ALR 2d 363.
Removal of child from state pending proceedings for custody as defeating jurisdiction
to award custody, 171 ALR 1405.
Service of notice to modify divorce decree
or other judgment as to child's custody upon
attorney who represented opposing party, 42
ALR 2d 1115.
Sexual abuse of child by parent as ground
for termination of parent's right to child, 58
ALR 3d 1074.
Sexual relations of custodial parent with
third person as justifying modification of
child custody order, 100 ALR 3d 625.
Social worker's expert testimony, admissibility on custody issue, 1 ALR 4th 837.
"Split," "divided," or "alternate" custody
of children, 92 ALR 2d 695.
Stepparent, award where contest between
natural parent and stepparent, 10 ALR 4th
767.
Violation of custody or visitation provision
of agreement or decree as affecting child support payment provision, and vice versa, 95
ALR 2d 118.
Welfare agency: consideration of investigation by welfare agency or the like in modifying award as between parents of custody of
children, 35 ALR 2d 629.
Law Reviews.
Modification of Child Custody Predicated
on Cohabitation of the Custodial Parent:
Jarrett v. Jarrett, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 169.

30-3-11. Repealed.
Repeal.
Section 30-3-11 (L. 1957, ch. 55, §2), relating to legislative policy and purposes, was
repealed by Laws 1961, ch. 59, § 2.

30-3-11.1. Family Court Act — Purpose. It is the public policy of the
state of Utah to strengthen the family life foundation of our society and
reduce the social and economic costs to the state resulting from broken
homes and to take reasonable measures to preserve marriages, particularly
where minor children are involved. The purposes of this act are to protect
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the rights of children and to promote the public welfare by preserving and
protecting family life and the institution of matrimony by providing the
courts with further assistance for family counseling, the reconciliation of
spouses and the amicable settlement of domestic and family controversies.
History: C. 1953, 30-3-11.1, enacted by L.
1969, ch. 72, § 8.
Title of Act.
An act amending Section 30-3-1, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as amended by Chapter 45,
Laws of Utah 1955, as amended by Chapter
57, Laws of Utah 1965; Section 30-3-4, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, as amended by Chapter 55, Laws of Utah 1957, as amended by
Chapter 59, Laws of Utah 1961; Section
30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953; Sections
30-3-6 and 30-3-7, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
as amended by Chapter 55, Laws of Utah
1957; Sections 30-3-8 and 30-3-10, Utah Code
Annotated 1953; and Sections 30-3-12 and
30-3-17, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
enacted by Chapter 55, Laws of Utah 1957;
enacting Sections 30-3-11.1, 30-3-11.2,
30-3-13.1, 30-3-14.1, 30-3-15.1, 30-3-15.2,
30-3-15.3, 30-3-15.4, 30-3-161, 30-3-16.2,
30-3-16.3, 30-3-16.4, 30-3-16.5, 30-3-16.6,
30-3-16.7 and 30-3-17.1, Utah Code Annotated
1953, relating to divorce; declaring the public

policy of the state of Utah to be the strengthening of family life by providing the courts
with assistance for family counseling, authorizing the establishment of family court divisions in the district courts; providing for
conciliation proceedings and marriage counseling services therein; providing for payment of salaries and expenses of family court
assistants from county funds; and repealing
Section 30-3-9, Utah Code Annotated 1953. Laws 1969, ch. 72.
Collateral References.
Divorce <£=> 87.5.
27A CJS Divorce § 103.1.
24 AmJur 2d 406, Divorce and Separation
§339.
Law Reviews.
The Family Court Act, 1970 Utah L. Rev.
106.
New Approaches of Psychiatry: Implications for Divorce Reform, Brigitte M.
Bodenheimer, 1970 Utah L. Rev. 191.

30-3-11.2. Family Court Act — Appointment of counsel for child.
If, in any action before any court of this state involving the custody or
support of a child, it shall appear in the best interests of the child to have
a separate exposition of the issues and personal representation for the
child, the court may appoint counsel to represent the child throughout the
action, and the attorney's fee for such representation may be taxed as a
cost of the action.
History: C. 1953, §30-3-11.2, enacted by
L. 1969, ch. 72, § 9.

30-3-12. Family Court Act — Courts to exercise family counseling
powers. Each district court of the respective judicial districts, while sitting in matters of divorce, annulment, separate maintenance, child custody,
alimony and support in connection therewith, child custody in habeas corpus proceedings, and adoptions, shall exercise the family counseling powers
conferred by this act.
History: C. 1953, 30-3-12, enacted by L.
1957, ch. 55, § 2; L. 1969, ch. 72, § 10.

child custody in habeas corpus proceedings,
alimony, support, and adoptions."

Compiler's Notes.
The 1969 amendment substituted "alimony
and support in connection therewith, child
custody in habeas corpus proceedings, and
adoptions" for "in connection therewith and

Title of Act.
An act amending Sections 30-3-4, 30-3-6
and 30-3-7, Utah Code Annotated 1953, relating to pleadings, findings and procedure in
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34-35-1

34-34-16. Right to bargain collectively not denied.
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to deny the right of employees to
bargain collectively with their employer by and through labor unions, labor
organizations or any other type of associations.
History: C. 1953, 34-34-16, enacted by L.
1969, ch. 85, § 158.

34-34-17. Violation of act a misdemeanor.
A violation of this act shall constitute a misdemeanor, and each day such
unlawful conduct, as defined in this chapter, is in effect or continued shall be
deemed a separate offense and shall be punishable as such, as provided in this
chapter.
History: C. 1953, 34-34-17, .enacted by L.
1969, ch. 85, § 159.
Meaning of "this act". — See same catchline in notes following § 34-28-7.

Cross-References. — Sentencing for mi6demeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 48 Am. Jur. 2d Labor and
Labor Relations § 20.
C.J.S. — 51B C.J.S. Labor Relations
§ 1003b.

Key Numbers. — Labor Relations «=» 1051,
1052.

CHAPTER 35
ANTIDISCRIMINATION ACT
Section
34-35-1.
34-35-2.
34-35-3.

34-35-4.
34-35-5.

Section
34-35-6.

Short title.
Definitions.
Jurisdiction of industrial commission — Creation of antidiscrimination division — Co-ordinator
of fair employment practices.
Antidiscrimination division —
Members — Meetings — Quorum.
Antidiscrimination division —
Powers and duties.

34-35-7.
34-35-7.1.

34-35-8.

Discriminatory or unfair employment practices — Permitted
practices.
Repealed.
Procedure for aggrieved person to
file claim — Investigations —
Adjudicative proceedings —
Settlement — Reconsideration
— Determination.
Judicial review — Procedure.

34-35-1. Short title.
This shall be known and may be cited as the "Utah Anti-Discriminatory
Act."
History: C. 1953, 34-35-1, enacted by L.
1969, ch. 85, § 160.
Cross-References. — Discrimination in

business establishments and places of public
accommodation prohibited, civil remedies,
§§ 13-7-1 to 13-7-4.
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34-35-8

(8) The commission or the charging party may reasonably and fairly amend
any charge, and the respondent may amend its answer.
(9) (a) If, upon all the evidence at a hearing, the administrative law judge
finds that a respondent has not engaged in a discriminatory or prohibited
employment practice, the administrative law judge shall issue an order
dismissing the action containing his findings of fact and conclusions of
law.
(b) If, the case is dismissed, the administrative law judge may recommend that the respondent be reimbursed for his costs.
(10) The commission may enact rules to govern, expedite, and effectuate
these procedures and its own actions that do not violate the provisions of
Chapter 46b, Title 63, or this chapter.
(11) The procedures contained in this section and Section 34-35-8 are the
exclusive remedy under state law for employment discrimination because of
race, color, sex, age, religion, national origin, or handicap.
History: C. 1953, 34-35-7.1, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 189, § 4; 1987, ch. 161, § 105.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment, effective January 1, 1988, rewrote Subsections (1), (3), (4) and (5), deleted former Subsections (6), (7), (11) and (12) and redesignated
the subsequent subsections accordingly; re-

wrote present Subsection (9); substituted "that
do not violate the provisions of Chapter 46b,
Title 63, or this chapter" for "subject to the
conditions and provisions of this chapter" in
present Subsection (10); and made minor
changes in phraseology and punctuation.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Procedure at hearing.
Remedies of commission.
Procedure at heairing.
It is not improper for the complainant's case
to be presented by the complainant personally
or by counsel instead of an attorney or agent
for the commission. Beehive Medical Elecs.,
Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 583 P.2d 53 (Utah
1978).

Remedies of commission.
Under proper circumstances, payment in
lieu of job reinstatement is a permissible affirmative action. Beehive Medical Elecs., Inc. v.
Industrial Comm'n, 583 P.2d 53 (Utah 1978).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Damages recoverable for wrongful
discharge of at-will employee, 44 A.L.R.4th
1131.
Rights of state and municipal public employees in grievance proceedings, 46 A.L.R.4th
913.

Reinstatement as remedy for discriminatory
discharge or demonition under Age Discrimination in Employment Act (29 USCS § 621 et
seq.), 78 A.L.R. Fed. 575.

34-35-8. Judicial review — Procedure.
(1) Any complainant, or respondent claiming to be aggrieved by a final
order of the commission, including a refusal to issue an order, may obtain
judicial review and the commission may obtain an order of court for its enforcement in a proceeding as provided in this section.
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PART 2
CRIMINAL HOMICIDE
Section
76-5-201.
76-5-202.

Section
76-5-203.
76-5-205.
76-5-207.

Criminal homicide — Elements
— Designations of offenses.
Murder in the first degree.

Murder in the second degree.
Manslaughter.
Automobile homicide.

76-5-201. Criminal homicide — Elements — Designations
of offenses.
(1) A person commits criminal homicide if he intentionally, knowingly,
recklessly, with criminal negligence, or acting with a mental state otherwise
specified in the statute defining the offense, causes the death of another
human being, including an unborn child. There shall be no cause of action for
criminal homicide against a mother or a physician for the death of an unborn
child caused by an abortion where the abortion was permitted by law and the
required consent was lawfully given.
(2) Criminal homicide is murder in the first and second degree, manslaughter, negligent homicide, or automobile homicide.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-201, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-201; L. 1983, ch. 90, § 3;
1983, ch. 95, § 1.
Compiler's Notes. — This section was
amended twice in the 1983 Session, once by
chapter 90 and once by chapter 95. Neither act
referred to the other. The section is printed incorporating the changes made by both amendments.
The 1983 amendment by chapter 90 inserted
"or acting with a mental state otherwise spedfied in the statute defining the offense" in the
first sentence of subsec. (1); deleted "unlawfully" before "causes the death" in the first sentence of subsec. (1); and made a minor change
in phraseology.
The 1983 amendment by chapter 95 added

"human being, including an unborn child" to
the first sentence of subsec. (1); and added the
second sentence of subsec. (1).
Self-defense.
J*** absence of self-defense is not one of the
prima facie elements of homicide needed to be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt by the state,
State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d 211 (Utah 1985).
Law Reviews. — For Everything There Is a
Season: The Right to Die in the United States,
1982 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 545.
Note, State v. Fontana: An Illusory Solution
to Utah's Depraved Indifference Mens Rea
Problem, 12 J. Contemp. L. 177 (1986).
A.L.R. — Corporation's criminal liability for
homicide, 45 A.L.R.4th 1021.

76-5-202. Murder in the first degree.
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the first degree if the actor
intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another under any of the following circumstances:
(a) The homicide was committed by a person who is confined in a jail or
other correctional institution.
(b) The homicide was committed incident to one act, scheme, course of
conduct, or criminal episode during which two or more persons are killed.
(c) The actor knowingly created a great risk of death to a person other
than the victim and the actor.
(d) The homicide was committed while the actor was engaged in the
commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or
attempting to commit, aggravated robbery, robbery, rape, rape of a child,
45
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76-7-203. Sale of child.
Law Reviews. — Artificial Insemination
and the Law, 4 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 935 (1982).

PART 3
ABORTION
Section
76-7-301.
Definitions.
76-7-305.5. Informed consent — Information
to be furnished to patient upon
request — Notification that information is available — Exceptions — Physician's report —
Annual report of department.
Physician's report to department
76-7-313.
of health.
76-7-321.
Contraceptive and abortion services — Funds — Minor — Definitions.
Public funds for provision of con76-7-322.

Section
76-7-323.
76-7-324.

76-7-325.

traceptive or abortion services
restricted.
Public funds for support entities
providing contraceptive or abortion services restricted.
Violation of restrictions on public
funds for contraceptive or abortion services as misdemeanor.
Notice to parent or guardian of
minor requesting contraceptive
— Definition of contraceptives
— Penalty for violation.

Law Reviews. —- Rethinking Roe v. Wade,
1985 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 231.

76-7-301. Definitions.
As used in this part:
(1) "Abortion" means the termination or attempted termination of
human pregnancy with an intent other than to produce a live birth or to
remove a dead unborn child, and includes all procedures undertaken to
kill a live unborn child and includes all procedures undertaken to produce
a miscarriage.
(2) "Physician" means a medical doctor licensed to practice medicine
and surgery in all branches thereof in this state, or a physician in the
employment of the government of the United States who is similarly
qualified.
(3) "Hospital" means a general hospital licensed by the state department of health according to chapter 21 of Title 26, and includes a clinic or
other medical facility to the extent that such clinic or other medical facility provides equipment and personnel sufficient in quantity and quality
to provide the same degree of safety to the pregnant woman and the
unborn child as would be provided for the particular medical procedures
undertaken by a general hospital licensed by the state department of
health. It shall be the responsibility of the state department of health to
determine if such clinic or other medical facility so qualifies and to so
certify.
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(3) "Hospital" means a general hospital licensed by the state division
of health according to Title 26, chapter 15, and includes a clinic or other
medical facility to the extent that such clinic or other medical facility
provides equipment and personnel sufficient in quantity and quality to
provide the same degree of safety to the pregnant woman and the unborn
child as would be provided for the particular medical procedures undertaken by a general hospital licensed by the state division of health. It
shall be the responsibility of the state division of health to determine if
Such clinic or other medical facility so qualifies and to so certify.
History: 0. 1953, 76-7-301, enacted by
L. 1974, ch. 33, § 1.
Compiler's Notes.
Laws 1974, ch. 33, §§1 to 17 repealed
old sections 76-7-301 to 76-7-317 (C. 1953,
76-7-301 to 76-7-302, enacted by ch. 196,
§§76-7-301 to 76-7-317), relating to abortion, and enacted new sections 76-7-301 to
76-7-317.
t i t l e of Act.
An act repealing and reenacting sections
76-7-301, 76-7-302, 76-7-303, 76-7-304, 767-305, 76-7-306, 76-7-307, 76-7-308, 76-7-309,
76-7-310, 76-7-311, 76-7-312, 76-7-313, 767-314, 76-7-315, 76-7-316, and 76-7-317, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by chapter 196, Laws of Utah 1973, and repealing
Sections 76-7-318, 76-7-319, and 76-7-320,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by
Chapter 196, Laws of Utah 1973; relating
to the abortion provision of the Utah
Criminal Code; providing definition, requirements, and procedures which must be
met and followed before an abortion may
be performed in the state of Utah.—Laws
1974, ch. 33.

CoUateral References.
Abortion<§=U.
1 C.J.S. Abortion § 1.
1 Am. Jur. 2d 188, Abortion § 1.
Admissibility, in prosecution based on
abortion, of evidence of commission of
similar crimes by accused, 15 A. L. E. 2d
1080.
Criminal responsibility of one other
than subject 0 r actual perpetrator , of
abortion, 4 A. £. R. 351.
Necessity, to warrant conviction of
abortion, that fetus be living at time of
commission of acts, 16 A. L. E. 2d 949.
Pregnancy as element of abortion or
homicide based thereon, 46 A. L. E. 2d
1393.
Eight of action for injury to or death of
woman who consented to abortion, 21
A. L. E. 2d 369.
Woman upon whom abortion is committed or attempted as accomplice for purposes of rule requiring corroboration of
accomplice testimony, 34 A. L. E. 3d 858.
Law Reviews.
Utah Legislative
Utah L. Eev. 646.

Cross-References.
Corroboration necessary, 77-31-14.

Survey—1974,

1974

DECISIONS UNDEE FOEMEE LAW
1973 abortion provisions unconstitutional.
Sections 76-7-302(3), 76-7-303 to 76-7-311,
and 76-7-313 to 76-7-319, enacted by Laws

1973, ch. 196, were held unconstitutional
by a three-judge federal district court.
Doe v. Eampton, 366 F. Supp. 189.

76-7-302. Circumstances under which abortion authorized.—An abortion may be performed in this state only under the following circumstances :
(1) If performed by a physician; and
(2) If performed ninety days or more after the commencement of the
pregnancy, it is performed in a hospital; and
(3) If performed when the unborn child is sufficiently developed to
have any reasonable possibility of survival outside its mother's womb,
the abortion is necessary to save the life of the pregnant woman or to
prevent serious and permanent damage to her health.
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History: C. 1053, 76-7-302, enacted by
L. 1974, ch. S3, § 2.

CoUateral References.
Abortion<£=>2.
1 C.J.S. Abortion § 2.
1 Am. Jur. 2d 195, Abortion § 14.

76-7-303. Concurrence of attending physician based on medical judgment.—No abortion may be performed in this state without the concurrence
of the attending physician, based on his best medical judgment.
History: C. 1953, 76-7-303, enacted by
L. 1974, ch. 33, § 3.

76-7-304. Considerations by physician—Notice to minor's parents or
guardian or married woman's husband.—To enable the physician to exercise his best medical judgment, he shall:
(1) Consider all factors relevant to the well-being of the woman
upon whom the abortion is to be performed including, but not limited to,
(a) Her physical, emotional and psychological health and safety,
(b) Her age,
(c) Her familial situation.
(2) Notify, if possible, the parents or guardian of the woman upon
whom the abortion is to be performed, if she is a minor or the husband of
the woman, if she is married.
History: O. 1953, 76-7-304, enacted by
L. 1974, ch. 33, § 4.
76-7-305. Consent requirements for abortion.—(1) No abortion may
be performed unless a voluntary and informed written consent is first
obtained by the attending physician from the woman upon whom the
abortion is to be performed.
(2) No consent obtained pursuant to the provisions of this section
shall be considered voluntary and informed unless the attending physician
has informed the woman upon whom the abortion is to be performed:
(a) Of the names and addresses of two licensed adoption agencies
in the state of Utah and the services that can be performed by those agencies, and nonagency adoption may be legally arranged; and
(b) Of the details of development of unborn children and abortion
procedures, including any foreseeable complications, risks, and the nature
of the post-operative recuperation period; and
(c) Of any other factors he deems relevant to a voluntary and informed consent.
History: C. 1953, 76-7-305, enacted by
il. 1974, cb. 33, § 5.
CoUateral Eeferences.
Mental competency of patient to consent to surgical operation or medical treatment, 25 A. L. R. 3d 1439.

Bight of minor to have abortion performed without parental consent, 42
A. L. R. 3d 1406.
Woman's right to have abortion without
consent of, or against objections of, child's
father, 62 A. L. R. 3d 1097.
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76-7-306. Physician, hospital employee, or hospital not required to participate in abortion.—(1) A physician, or any other person who is a
member of or associated with the staff of a hospital, or any employee
of a hospital in which an abortion has been authorized, who states an
objection to an abortion or the practice of abortion in general on moral
or religious grounds shall not be required to participate in the medical
procedures which will result in the abortion, and the refusal of any person
to participate shall not form the basis of any claim for damages on account of the refusal or for any disciplinary or recriminatory action against
such person, nor shall any moral or religious scruples or objections to
abortions be the grounds for any discrimination in hiring in this state.
(2) Nothing in this act [part] shall require any private and/or
denominational hospital to admit any patient for the purpose of performing
an abortion.
History: 0. 1953, 76-7-306, enacted by
L. 1974, ch. 33, §6.

76-7-307. Medical procedure required to save life of unborn child.—
If an abortion is performed when the unborn child is sufficiently developed
to have any reasonable possibility of survival outside its mother's womb,
the medical procedure used must be that which, in the best medical
judgment of the physician will give the unborn child the best chance of
survival. No medical procedure designed to kill or injure an unborn child
may be used unless necessary, in the opinion of the woman's physician,
to save her life or prevent serious and permanent damage to her health.
History: 0. 1953, 76-7-307, enacted by
L. 1974, cb.S3>§7.

76-7-308. Medical skills required to preserve life of unborn child.—
Consistent with the purpose of saving the life of the woman or preventing
serious and permanent damage to the woman's health, the physician
performing the abortion must use all of his medical skills to attempt to
promote, preserve and maintain the life of any unborn child sufficiently
developed to have any reasonable possibility of survival outside of the
mother's womb.
History: 0. 1953, 76-7-308, enacted by
L. 1974, ch. S3, § 8.

76-7-309. Pathologist's report.—Any human tissue removed during an
abortion shall be submitted to a pathologist who shall make a report,
including, but not limited to whether there was a pregnancy, and if possible,
whether the pregnancy was aborted by evacuating the uterus.
History: O. 1953, 76-7-309, enacted by
X. 1974, cb. S3, § 9.

76-7-310. Experimentation with unborn children prohibited—Testing
for genetic defects.—Live unborn children may not be used for experimentation, but when advisable, in the best medical judgment of the physician, may be tested for genetic defects.
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ex rel. Kelsey, 20 Utah 2d 131, 434 P.2d 445
(1967).

vided. State ex rel. F _ v. Dade, 14 Utah 2d 47,
376 P.2d 948 (1962).

Conditions for restoration of parental custody.
Where there had been previous findings of
parent's unfitness to have custody of his minor
daughter, it was not an abuse of discretion for
court to require such parent to conduct himself
"becomingly" for a period of ten months before
such custody would be given. State v.
Sorensen, 102 Utah 474, 132 P.2d 132 (1942).

Notice.
After original notice of petition had been
given, no further notice need be given of application by probation officer or otherwise for a
modification, suspension, or change of any order or judgment affecting the custody, control
or conduct of a juvenile delinquent because
child was constructively in custody of such
court and failure to give further notice was not
jurisdictional. It was better practice, however,
to give notice of application both to delinquent

Grandparent's petition for custody.
•HUB section does not prohibit a grandparent
from filing a petition for custody of his grandchild after the rights of the grandchild s parents have been terminated. State ex rel. Summers v. Wulffenstein, 571 P.2d 1319 (Utah
1977).
_,
.
....
.
Mental condition of parent.
Where children had been placed in custody of
state department of public welfare for purpose
of adoption because of parents mental condition, mother was not entitled to restoration of
custody where she was unable to demonstrate
any real understanding of what was necessary
for the welfare of the children or how much
money it would take or how it could be pro-

and

t0 t h o s e w h o m i

welfare
g n

ht be interested

Stoker v Gowans 45 Utah 556

1916E Ann

Cag

1Q25

in

his

147 p

(1913)

Right to hearing.
Where juvenile court had previously entered
a proper order depriving parents of custodv of
their minor children and parents petitioned for
r e s t o r a t i o n of e u s t o d v o n ^ ^ ^
of c h a n g e d
c o n d l t i o n S - r e f u s a l 0 f j u v e n i l e c o u r t t 0 g,. ant
ts a hearj
In re S t a t e ex re,

w a g a n a b u s e of d i s c r e t i o n
L

j j

n

U t a h 2d 393

36Q

p 9^ 435 (196I)
Cited in State ex rel. A.H. v. Mr. & Mrs. H.
(Utah 1986) 716 P.2d 284.

78-3a-48, Termination of parental rights — Grounds —
Hearing — Effect of order — Placement of child
— Voluntary petition of parent,
(1) The court may decree a termination of all parental rights with respect to
one or both parents if the court finds either (a), (b), (c), or (d) as follows:
(a) that the parent or parents are unfit or incompetent by reason of
conduct or condition which is seriously detrimental to the child;
(b) that the parent or parents have abandoned the child. It is prima
facie evidence of abandonment that the parent or parents, although having legal custody of the child, have surrendered physical custody of the
child, and for a period of six months following the surrender have not
manifested to the child or to the person having the physical custody of the
child a firm intention to resume physical custody or to make arrangements for the care of the child;
(c) that after a period of trial, during which the child was left in his
own home under protective supervision or probation, or during which the
child was returned to live in his own home, the parent or parents substantially and continuously or repeatedly refused or failed to give the child
proper parental care and protection; or
(d) has failed to communicate via mail, telephone, or otherwise for one
year with the child or shown the normal interest of a natural parent,
without just cause.
(2) A termination of parental rights may be ordered only after a hearing is
held specifically on the question of terminating the rights of the parent or
parents. A verbatim record of the proceedings must be taken and the parties
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must be advised of their right to counsel. No hearing may be held earlier than
ten days after service of summons is completed inside or outside of the state.
The summons must contain a statement to the effect that the rights of the
parent or parents are proposed to be permanently terminated in the proceedings. The statement may be made in the summons originally issued in the
proceeding or in a separate summons subsequently issued.
(3) Unless there is an appeal from the order terminating the rights of one or
both parents, the order permanently terminates the legal parent-child relationship and all the rights and duties, including residual parental rights and
duties, of the parent or parents involved.
(4) Upon the entry of an order terminating the rights of the parent or
parents, the court may (a) place the child in the legal custody and guardianship of a child placement agency or the department of public welfare for
purposes of adoption, or (b) make any other disposition of the child authorized
under § 78-3a-39. All adoptable children shall be placed for adoption.
(5) The parent-child relationship may be terminated upon voluntary petition of one or both parents if the court finds that the termination is in the best
interests of the parent and the child. This termination with respect to one
parent does not affect the rights of the other parent.
History: L. 1965, ch. 165, § 47, formerly C. of parental rights upon a finding of best inter1953, 55-10-109 redes, as 78-3a-48; L. 1980, ests of the child without requiring a finding of
ch. 40, § 1; 1981, ch. 157, § 1; 1985, ch. 199, parental unfitness, abandonment, or substan§ 1tial neglect was unconstitutional on its face
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amend- s i n c e i t violated a parent's rights to his child
ment substituted "a termination" for "an invol- u n d e r U t a h Const., Art. I, Sees. 7 and 25 and
untary termination" in Subsection (1); rewrote t h e n i n t h a n d f o u r t e enth amendments of the
Subsection (l)(a), which formerly read as f e d e r a l C o n s t i t u t i o n ; t h a t t h e 1 9 8 i amendment
amended by Laws 1981, chapter 157, § 1; de- tQ ^ ^
^ ^
w h k h only added n e w
leted
Subsections
(lXani)
through c J *
.I. u-u" u ± • «. ^ J
/iw
\i
•••wn\
ui
_
c
i
J
J
J
for
determining
B the childs best interest under
(lKaXviuKC), which formerly read as amended A,
. , , . ,,. , , ,
. nnon
,
by Laws 1981, chapter 157, § 1; added Subsec- t h e s t * n d a r d e s t a b l l s h e d °>' t h * 1 9 ^ aniendm e n t do
not r e m a i n i n ect
tion (Did); substituted "may" for "shall" in the
' fL
f
after the invahthird sentence of Subsection (2); and made d a t l o n o f t h e 1 9 8 0 amendment; and that this
minor changes in phraseology.
section, as enacted in 1965, is not repealed, but
Compiler's Notes. — The Supreme Court of remains in force to the same extent as if the
Utah, in In re J. P. (1982) 648 P.2d 1364, held: portions of the 1980 and 1981 amendments inthat the 1980 amendment to this section, validated by the opinion had never been enwhich permitted the involuntary termination

acted.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Abandonment.
Abandonment by parent not in legal custody of child.
Adoption considerations.
Conditions precedent to termination.
Diligent search for missing parents.
Divorce decrees.
Evidence.
—Sufficient to terminate rights.
—Standard.
—Standard of proof.
Grandparent's rights.
—Recommendation of welfare representative.
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Stalking the Good
Samaritan: Communists, Capitalists and the
Duty to Rescue, 1977 Utah L. Rev. 529.
Utah Legislative Survey — 1983, 1984 Utah
L. Rev. 115, 217.
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Taking

Notice of Good Samaritan and Duty to Rescue
Laws, 11 J. Contemp. L. 219 (1984).
A.L.R. — Construction of "Good Samaritan"
statute excusing from civil liability one rendering care in emergency, 39 A.L.R.3d 222.
Key Numbers. — Negligence *» 8.

78-11-23. Right to life — State policy.
The Legislature finds and declares that it is the public policy of this state to
encourage all persons to respect the right to life of all other persons, regardless of age, development, condition or dependency, including all handicapped
persons and all unborn persons.
History: L. 1983, ch. 167, § 1.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Utah Legislative
Survey — 1983, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 115, 221.
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Note,

Alquijay v. St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hospital: The
Inequitable Umbrella of Wrongful Life, 12 J.
Contemp. L. 137 (1986).

78-11-24. Act or omission preventing abortion not actionable.
A cause of action shall not arise, and damages shall not be awarded, on
behalf of any person, based on the claim that but for the act or omission of
another, a person would not have been permitted to have been born alive but
would have been aborted.
History: L. 1983, ch. 167, § 2.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Wrongful Birth and
Wrongful Life: Analysis of the Causes of Action and the Impact of Utah's Statutory Breakwater, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 833.

Journal of Contemporary Law. — Note,
Alquijay v. St Luke's-Roosevelt Hospital: The
Inequitable Umbrella of Wrongful Life, 12 J.
Contemp. L. 137 (1986).

78-11-25. Failure or refusal to prevent birth not a defense.
The failure or refusal of any person to prevent the live birth of a person
shall not be a defense in any action, and shall not be considered in awarding
damages or child support, or imposing a penalty, in any action.
History; L. 1983, ch. 167, § 3.
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JUDICIAL CODE
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Utah Law Reviews. —- Comment, The Utah
Supreme Court and the Utah State Constitution, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 319.

Am. Jur. 2d. — 2 Am. Jur. 2d Adoption
§ 10.
C.J.S. — 2 C.J.S. Adoption of Persons § 13.
Key Numbers. — Adoption «= 4.

78-30-3. Adoption by married persons.
A married man, not lawfully separated from his wife, cannot adopt a child
without the consent of his wife, nor can a married woman, not thus separated
from her husband, adopt a child without his consent, if the spouse not consenting is capable of giving such consent.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 3; C.L.
1917, § 12; L. 1919, ch. 1, § 1; R.S. 1933 & C.
1943, 14-4-3.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 2 Am. Jur. 2d Adoption
§41.

C.J.S. — 2 C.J.S. Adoption of Persons § 14.
Key Numbers. — Adoption «=> 7.

78-30-4. Consent to adoption — Paternity claims.
(1) A child cannot be adopted without the consent of each living parent
having rights in relation to said child, except that consent is not necessary
from a father or mother who has been judicially deprived of the custody of the
child on account of cruelty, neglect or desertion; provided, that the district
court may order the adoption of any child, without notice to or consent in court
of the parent or parents thereof, whenever it shall appear that the parent or
parents whose consent would otherwise be required have theretofore, in writing, acknowledged before any officer authorized to take acknowledgments,
released his or her or their control or custody of such child to any agency
licensed to receive children for placement or adoption under Chapter 8a, Title
55, and such agency consents, in writing, to such adoption or whenever it
shall appear that the parent or parents whose consent would otherwise be
required have theretofore, in writing, released his or her or their control,
custody, and all parental rights and interests in such child to any agency
licensed or authorized by statute to receive children for placement or adoption
in any state pursuant to that state's laws and said agency has in turn, in
writing, released its control and custody of such child to any agency licensed
under Chapter 8a, Title 55, or to any person, or persons, selected by that
agency licensed under Utah law, as adoptive parents for said child, and such
Utah agency consents, in writing, to such adoption.
(2) A minor parent shall have the power to consent to the adoption of such
parent's child, and a minor parent shall have the power to release such parent's control or custody of such parent's child to any agency licensed to receive
children for placement or adoption under Chapter 8 [Chapter 8a], Title 55,
and, such a consent or release so executed shall be valid and have the same
force and effect as a consent or release executed by an adult parent. A minor
parent, having so executed a release or consent, cannot revoke the same upon
such parent's attaining the age of majority.
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(3) (a) A person who is the father or claims to be the father of an illegitimate child may claim rights pertaining to his paternity of the child by
registering with the registrar of vital statistics in the department of
health, a notice of his claim of paternity of an illegitimate child and of his
willingness and intent to support the child to the best of his ability. The
department of health shall provide forms for the purpose of registering
the notices, and the forms shall be made available through the department and in the office of the county clerk in every county in this state.
(b) The notice may be registered prior to the birth of the child but must
be registered prior to the date the illegitimate child is relinquished or
placed with an agency licensed to provide adoption services or prior to the
filing of a petition by a person with whom the mother has placed the child
for adoption. The notice shall be signed by the registrant and shall include his name and address, the name and last known address of the
mother, and either the birthdate of the child or the probable month and
year of the expected birth of the child. The department of health shall
maintain a confidential registry for this purpose.
(c) Any father of such child who fails to file and register his notice of
claim to paternity and his agreement to support the child shall be barred
from thereafter bringing or maintaining any action to establish his paternity of the child. Such failure shall further constitute an abandonment of
said child and a waiver and surrender of any right to notice of or to a
hearing in any judicial proceeding for the adoption of said child, and the
consent of such father to the adoption of such child shall not be required.
(d) In any adoption proceeding pertaining to an illegitimate child, if
there is no showing that the father has consented to the proposed adoption, it shall be necessary to file with the court prior to the granting of a
decree allowing the adoption a certificate from the department of health,
signed by the state registrar of vital statistics wrhich certificate shall state
that a diligent search has been made of the registry of notices from fathers of illegitimate children and that no registration has been found
pertaining to the father of the illegitimate child in question.
History: L. 1981, ch. 126, § 61.
Repeals and Enactments. — Laws 1981,
ch. 126, § 61 repealed former § 78-30-4 (R.S.
1898 & C.L. 1907, § 4; C.L. 1917, § 13; L.
1925, ch. 91, § 1: R.S, 1933,14-4-4; L. 1941, ch.
16, § 1; C. 1943, 14-4-4; L. 1963. ch. 192, § 1;
1965, ch. 168, § 1; 1966 (1st S.S.), ch. 20, § 1;
1975, ch. 94, § 1), relating to consent to adoption, and enacted present § 78-30-4.
Compiler's Notes. — Chapter 8, Title 55,

referred to in this section, was repealed by
Laws 1971, ch. 133, § 7. For present provisions
concerning child placing agencies, see
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Abandonment.
Acknowledgment of signature to consent.
Appearance before district court.
Consent.
Construction of statute.
Duress.
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78-30-4. Consent to adoption — Paternity claims.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
—Federal abstention.
—State action.
Father's filing of notice of paternity.
Constitutionality.
a private adoption to the extent that they may
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v.
the constitutional- were constitutionally> terminated. Swayne
£
lty of this section in favor of requiring resolution by the state courts of the questions presented. Swayne v. L.D.S. Social Servs., 670 F.
Supp. 1537 (D. Utah 1987).
State action.
Termination of father's parental rights by
operation of this section, which provides that
the father of an illegitimate child conclusively
is presumed to have abandoned his child if he
fails to file a claim of paternity and notice of
willingness to support the child in accordance
with Subsection (3)(b), implicates the actors in

xit h 1987^ ^ 1 Y O ' u , v /
^«FF- xuu, v ^.
l9o/).
Father's filing of notice of paternity.
T o a p p i y t h i s s e c tion in order to deprive a
putative father and his child of the possible
benefits of their relationship simply because
the father filed a notice of his claim of paternity filed just a few hours after the mother and
her grandfather had filed a petition for adoption would fly in the face of fundamental fairness and due process. In re K.B.E., 63 Utah
Adv. Rep. 27 (Ct. App. 1987).
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Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Family
Law, 1987 Utah L. Rev. 200.
Brigham Young Law Review. — Note,

The Putative Father's Due Process Rights to
Notice and a Hearing: In re Baby Boy Doe,
1986 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1081.

78-30-5. Consent unnecessary — Parents fail to support or
communicate with child — Noncustodial parent
— Conditions.
( D A child may be adopted without the consent of the parent or parents,
when the district court in which the proceedings are pending determines,
after notice to the parent or parents in a manner determined by the court, that
the parent or parents, having the ability and duty to do so, have not provided
support and have made no effort or only token effort, without good cause, to
maintain a parental relationship with the child.
(2) A child may be adopted without the consent of the parent not having
custody of the child, when the district court in which the proceedings are
pending determines:
(a) the noncustodial parent is not obligated under any order or judgment of any court or administrative body to pay for support of the child;
and
(b) the noncustodial parent has made no effort or only token effort,,
without good cause, to maintain a parental relationship with the child.
(3) It is a rebuttable presumption that no effort to maintain a parental
relationship has been made:
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(a) under Subsection (1), if the parent or parents have failed to support
and communicate with the child for a period of one year or longer; or
(b) under Subsection (2), if the noncustodial parent has failed to communicate with the child for a period of one year or longer.
History: C. 1953, 78-30-5, enacted by L.
1977, ch. 147, § 1; 1988, ch. 165, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 1988, added Subsection designation (1); deleted the former second
sentence of Subsection (1) which read "It is a

rebuttable presumption that no effort has been
made if the parent or parents have failed to
support and communicate with the child for a
period of one year or longer"; and added Subsections (2) and (3).

78-30-7. Jurisdiction of district and juvenile court.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in K.O. v. Denison, 74 Utah Adv. Rep.
29 (Ct. App. 1988).

78-30-8. Procedure — Agreement of adopting parents.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Appearance before district court
The appearance requirement of the person
adopting the child, the child adopted, and the
consenting parent must be strictly construed

and is jurisdictionally required, and that, without compliance, the adoption could be nullified,
In re M.L.T., 746 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1987).

78-30-11. Rights and liabilities of natural parents.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Note, Religious
Matching and Parental Preference: Easton v.
Angus, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 559.

78-30-12. Adoption by acknowledgment.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
rights or custody, the biological fathers rights
with respect to the legitimated child are adjudicated under the divorce laws codified in
§§ 30-3-5 and 30-3-10. Chandler v. Mathews
734 P.2d 907 (Utah 1987).

Father.
—Adjudication of rights.
Concomitant with the rights of a legitimated
child adopted by the acknowledgment of its father are the rights of its biological father. In a
dispute with the child's mother over visitation
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